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INTRODUCTION
Although the threats of global climate change1 are by no
means limited to coastal areas,2 coastal cities face extreme and

1. Some definitions of “climate change” focus on changes in climate caused by
human activities only, while others include all changes in climate, whether caused by
human activity or natural variability in climate. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY 6 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter AR4 WGII], available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report
_wg2_report_impacts_adaptation_and_vulnerability.htm [http://perma.cc/LF39-GG33]
(“IPCC usage refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural
variability or as a result of human activity. This usage differs from that in the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, where climate change refers to a change of
climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the
composition of the global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate
variability observed over comparable time periods.”). A handful of scholars advocate
for use of the term “climate disruption,” first coined by John Holdren, rather than
“global warming” or “climate change,” arguing that climate disruption is a more
accurate, active and instrumental term. See David Malakoff, Let’s Call It ‘Climate
Disruption,’ White House Science Adviser Suggests (Again), SCIENCE (May 2, 2014, 3:15
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unique challenges. Global temperatures are increasing and the
rate of increase is accelerating—with corresponding increases
in sea levels, acidification of oceans, and losses of floodmitigating wetlands.3 Storms and other extreme weather
events are increasing in frequency and severity.4 As a result,
coastal communities are already experiencing rising sea levels,
eroding shores, more massive storm surges, more severe
storms, salt water intrusion, loss of land and changes in
marine resources5—and all cities can expect increased
incidences of, and more extreme, storms, heat waves, droughts,
and other extreme weather conditions.6
New York City in particular faces grave threats from climate
change. With 520 miles of coastline, the City’s coastline is
longer than the coastlines of Miami, Boston, Los Angeles, and
San Francisco combined.7 According to the New York City
Mayor’s Office, more than eight million New Yorkers live in
areas vulnerable to flooding, storm surges and other natural
disaster-related risks.8 Nearly half a million of these residents
live on 120 square miles of land that is less than 6 feet above
the high tide line.9 This extremely vulnerable land is also
PM), available at http://news.sciencemag.org/climate/2014/05/lets-call-it-climatedisruption-white-house-science-adviser-suggests-again [http://perma.cc/9WBC-TC26].
2. See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Land Use and Climate Change Bubbles: Resilience,
Retreat and Due Diligence, 39 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 337, 343 (2015)
(discussing climate change related real estate market collapses in Sidney, a village
located along the Susquehanna River in the Catskill Mountains of New York;
Spicewood Beach, a lakeside community in Texas; and Elkhart, a small farming town
in southwestern Kansas).
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See id.
5. See id. Of course, the effects of these changes are not limited to coastal cities, nor
are the consequences of direct harms to coastal cities limited to those localities. See
generally Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and the Fifth
Assessment Report, in Sarah Adams-Schoen et al., A Response to the IPCC Fifth
Assessment, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10027, 10031 (2015) (discussing
global interdependencies with respect to the effect of climate change-related harms).
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. CITY OF NEW YORK, PLANYC: A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK 40 (June
2013) [hereinafter STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
sirr/html/report/report.shtml [http://perma.cc/C58V-B56D].
8. Id. at 207.
9. BEN STRAUSS ET AL., NEW YORK AND THE SURGING SEA: A VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT WITH PROJECTIONS FOR SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL FLOOD RISK,
CLIMATE CENTRAL RESEARCH REPORT 8 (2014), available at http://sealevel.climate
central.org/uploads/ssrf/NY-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/3KFX-6LDZ].
Super Storm
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home to property valuing $101 billion, more than 1,500 miles of
road, 1,200 EPA-listed sites, and 100 public schools.10
Given these vulnerabilities, it may not be surprising that
New York City is on a short list of U.S. cities that began
proactively planning for future climate-change related risks in
the early 2000s.11 Since then, the city has assessed its
vulnerabilities, planned for, and, significantly, begun
implementing extensive mitigation12 and adaptation13
initiatives.14 But, notwithstanding New York City’s arguably
proactive15 commitment to climate change resilience,16 on
Sandy’s peak flood elevation was nine feet above the high tide line as measured at the
Battery in New York City. Id.
10. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 8.
11. The city released PlaNYC: A Greater, Greener New York, its first long-term
comprehensive sustainability plan, on Earth Day, April 22, 2007. See CITY OF NEW
YORK, PLANYC: A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK (April 2007) [hereinafter GREENER,
GREATER], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/publications/publications.
shtml?process=1&type=Report [http://perma.cc/P24G-7VWM]; see also JoAnn Carmin
et al., PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN URBAN CLIMATE ADAPTATION PLANNING:
RESULTS OF A GLOBAL SURVEY 10 (2012) [hereinafter ICLEI 2011 SURVEY], available at
http://www.icleiusa.org/action-center/learn-from-others/progress-and-challenges-inurban-climate-adaptation-planning-results-of-a-global-survey
[http://perma.cc/SR624C6A] (stating that as of 2011, only 13% of U.S. cities surveyed had completed even an
assessment of climate-change related vulnerabilities); infra notes 59–60 &
accompanying text (discussing ICLEI 2011 SURVEY).
12. The IPCC defines “mitigation” as “anthropogenic intervention to reduce the
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases.” AR4 WGII, supra note 1, at 750.
13. The IPCC defines “adaptation” as “the adjustment in natural or human systems
in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates
harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.” Id. at 6.
14. See generally infra Part II.
15. Although New York City was among a handful of U.S. cities that began
comprehensive planning for climate change in the early 2000s, from a global
perspective the city was late to the party. See Harriet Bulkey & Heike Schroeder,
Global Cities and the Politics of Climate Change, in HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 249, 250–51 (Peter Dauvergne ed., 2012) (identifying the
following five U.S. municipalities that participated in a CO2 reduction project which
began in 1991: Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; Portland, Oregon; Chula Vista,
California; Denver, Colorado; Miami-Dade County, Florida); see also Portland, Or.,
Resolution No. 35207 (Nov. 10, 1993).
16. The New York City Mayor’s Office defines “resiliency” as “our capacity to
survive, adapt, and grow in the face of stress and shocks.” CITY OF NEW YORK, ONE
CITY, BUILT TO LAST 20 (Revision 1.1 2014), available at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/builttolast/assets/downloads/pdf/OneCity.pdf [http://perma.cc/GG49-NHDN]. The
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction defines “resilience” as “[t]he capacity
of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting
or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and
structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of
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October 29, 2012, “Super Storm Sandy” struck a massive blow
to the Big Apple—which caused the deaths of 44 New
Yorkers,17 left nearly 2 million people without power,18 and
resulted in $19 billion in damage19—highlighting the need to
weigh climate change and disaster resiliency more heavily on
the City’s policy scales.
Describing the effect of Sandy on the relative priority of
climate resilience policies, the City observed that “[i]n October
2012, with the arrival of Sandy, the case for increased climate
resiliency—even beyond the initiatives [previously] set
forth . . . —was forcefully made to all New Yorkers.”20 New
York City responded by undertaking a prompt and remarkably
thorough analysis of its climate change resilience, and
immediately implementing many of the measures identified in
that analysis.21 This resulted in, among other things, extensive
amendments to zoning and building codes to transform New
York City into a more disaster-resilient city22 and to continue
decreasing New York City’s greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions.23
A change in the City’s administration on January 1, 2014,
heralded an even greater commitment to mitigation, additional
sustainability initiatives, and continued implementation of the
prior administration’s comprehensive sustainability and
resilience plans, A Greener, Greater New York and A Stronger,
More Resilient New York, respectively.24 Among other things,

organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better
future protection and to improve risk reduction measures.” Terminology, U.N. OFFICE
FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminologyeng%20home.htm [http://perma.cc/C69Q-BHEV] (last visited May 20, 2015). This
article treats the term “resilience” (or “resiliency,” its more popular form in the United
States) as encompassing both adaptation and mitigation. See infra Part I.
17. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 13–14.
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 40.
21. Id. at 3; see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing Special Initiative for Rebuilding
and Resiliency).
22. See infra Part II.B.5 (discussing amendments to New York City’s zoning and
building codes).
23. See infra Parts II.B.1 and III.C (discussing GHG emissions reductions targets).
24. See also CITY OF NEW YORK, PROGRESS REPORT 2014: A GREENER, GREATER
NEW YORK, A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK (2014), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/downloads/pdf/publications/140422_PlaNYCP-Report_
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Mayor de Blasio’s Administration increased the City’s GHG
emissions reduction commitment from 30% by 2030 to 80% by
2050 (from a 2005 baseline), formed the Mayor’s Office of
Recovery and Resiliency, amended the City’s air pollution code,
and expressly acknowledged the City’s role in conducting and
regulating substantial emissions-generating activities.25 In
2014, the City published its sixth annual progress report on the
City’s mitigation and resilience initiatives26 and its fourth
annual benchmarking report on the reduction of GHG
emissions from buildings,27 adding to a voluminous collection of
data tracking the City’s strategies, successes, and challenges.28
Given the robustness of New York City’s approach as well as
the need for “high adaptation” of coastal cities,29 municipalities
across the United States, and coastal cities in particular, can
benefit from examining New York City’s strategies, successes,
and lessons learned.30 As discussed below, many of New York
City’s climate change measures have put the City in a league of
its own, contributing significantly to the City’s resilience,
decreasing GHG emissions, and providing significant co-

FINAL_Web.pdf [http://perma.cc/KN9D-XM7J] [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT 2014];
see generally infra Part II.
25. See generally infra Part II; PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24.
26. See PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24.
27. See CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW 84 BENCHMARKING REPORT
SEPTEMBER 2014 (September 2014), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/
downloads/pdf/publications/2014_nyc_ll84_benchmarking_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/
QHD5-EV58] [hereinafter BENCHMARKING REPORT 2014].
28. See generally PlaNYC Publications, MAYOR’S OFFICE OF RECOVERY &
RESILIENCY,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/publications/publications.shtml?
process=1&type=Report [http://perma.cc/P24G-7VWM] (last visited May 20, 2015)
(providing downloadable pdfs of 63 City reports related to sustainability).
29. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (discussing AR5 WGII conclusion
that, based on 2°C and 4°C pathways, sea level related risks like flooding remain
medium to high even for highly adapted communities). IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 23 (2014)
[hereinafter WGII SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS], available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/
images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z3RU-JUDJ].
30. See generally ICLEI—LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY USA, THE
PROCESS BEHIND PLANYC:
HOW THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEVELOPED ITS
COMPREHENSIVE LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY PLAN 5 (2010) [hereinafter ICLEI
PLANYC CASE STUDY] (evaluating New York City’s sustainability planning process “to
share the lessons learned from New York with communities around the world”),
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/downloads/pdf/publications/iclei_planyc_
case_study_201004.pdf [http://perma.cc/HL5X-7DKE].
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benefits31 like improved public health, cleaner air and,
according to the City, more affordable housing.32
But, the City also faces a host of challenges that threaten to
“sink” it, including wicked policy binds, ineffective regional
structures, a lack of support at the federal level, and other
conditions that constrain the City’s ability to remain resilient
such as its massive population, coastal geography, and
increasingly frequent and intense coastal storms, storm surges,
and flooding.33 As a result, the City’s climate change resilience
initiatives may still fall short of what is required to sufficiently
“moderate[] harm” from dangerous interference with the
climate system.34
Part I of this article examines the role of local governments
in climate change adaptation and mitigation. Part II discusses
climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives New York
City undertook before and after Super Storm Sandy. Part III
assesses the City’s initiatives, evaluating which initiatives
provide role models for other municipalities as well as key
challenges posed by the City’s approach.

31. AR5 defines “co-benefits” as “positive effects on human health that arise from
interventions to reduce emissions of those CAPs [climate-altering pollutants] that
warm the planet or vice versa.” See K.R. Smith et al., Human Health: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Co-Benefits, in IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION,
AND VULNERABILITY CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 715 (C.B. Field et al.
eds., 2014), available at https://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGIIAR5-Chap11_
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZV9-BMCK].
For example, increasing “[e]nergy
efficiency and reducing reliance on coal for electricity generation not only reduces
emissions of greenhouse gases, but also reduces emissions of fine particles that cause
many premature deaths worldwide as well as reducing other health impacts from the
coal fuel cycle.” Id. at 742; see generally id. at 737–41 (evaluating data on potential cobenefits from climate adaptation and mitigation measures).
32. See infra Parts II and III (discussing City’s initiatives); see, e.g., infra Part III.D
(discussing the City’s robust and transparent data collection, analysis, and
benchmarking initiatives).
33. See, e.g., infra Parts III.B and C (discussing “super wicked” problem of
waterfront development and critiquing City’s GHG emissions reduction targets).
34. See AR4 WGII, supra note 1, at 6 (defining “adaptation” in terms of
“moderat[ing] harm or exploit[ing] beneficial opportunities”).
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I. CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE FROM THE GROUND UP
Local governments are often referred to as being “on the front
The role of local
line” of climate change adaptation.35
governments in climate change mitigation, however, has
received less attention,36 despite the fact that local
governments conduct and regulate activities that contribute a
substantial portion of the global inventory of GHG emissions.37
As the following discussion of the municipal role in mitigation
and adaptation shows, 2014 heralded a shift in which
governmental and nongovernmental bodies at all levels began
recognizing the central role of local governments in both
climate change adaptation and mitigation.
Discussion of municipalities’ mitigation and adaptation roles,
respectively, and indeed the term “adaptation” itself, however,
may suggest a false dichotomy that could mislead municipal
officials and the public into believing resilience can be achieved
through robust adaptation alone. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change’s (“IPCC”) most recent projections
suggest that the efficacy of adaptation depends on aggressive
mitigation:
Prospects for climate-resilience pathways for sustainable
development are related fundamentally to what the world
accomplishes with climate change mitigation (high confidence).
Since mitigation reduces the rate as well as the magnitude of
warming, it also increases the time available for adaptation to a
particular level of climate change, potentially by several decades.
35. See, e.g., J. Kevin Healy & L. Margaret Barry, Local Initiatives, in GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE & U.S. LAW 375 (Michael B. Gerrard & Jody Freeman eds., 2d ed.
2014) (referring to local jurisdictions as “the government entities on the front line in
protecting the health and welfare of their citizens” and therefore principally
responsible for coping with climate change-related harms).
36. See Hossein Estiri, 21 Percent: The Role of Socioeconomics and Housing
Characteristics on CO2 Emissions from the U.S. Residential Sector 2 (Nov. 1, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2196984 [http://perma.cc/ABG7-XN7P] (criticizing
climate scientists for initially discounting significance of cities in climate change);
Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., Cities Lead the Way in Climate-Change Action, 467 NATURE
909, 909 (2010) (“Cities were initially ignored by most climate-change scientists.”).
37. See Nancy B. Grimm et al., Global Change and the Ecology of Cities, 319 SCI.
756 (2008) (showing cities contribute substantially to climate change); Sue Grimmond,
Urbanization and Global Environmental Change: Local Effects of Urban Warming,
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 83 (2007) (showing cities contribute substantially to climate change);
see also INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 (2014).
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Delaying mitigation may reduce options for climate-resilient
pathways in the future.38

In other words, failure to promptly and aggressively mitigate
climate change will likely significantly diminish the ability of
coastal communities39 to moderate harms like flooding and
foreclose opportunities to do so in the future.40 Likewise,
although mitigation measures can limit the amount of GHG
emissions, they too are only part of the solution because “much
of the change in climate over the next 30 to 40 years is already
determined by past and present emissions.”41 Additionally,
current and near-future risks from climate change already pose
significant enough threats that coastal communities must
undertake adaptation initiatives to protect public health,
property, and infrastructure.42
Accordingly, this article treats the concept of resilience
planning as inclusive of both adaptation and mitigation
planning, and concludes that effective regulation at the local
level cannot be achieved through adaptation alone no matter
how robust. Additionally, this article urges scholars, lawyers,
and policy makers to recognize in their communications the
need for an integrated approach.43

38. WGII SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 29, at 28.
39. Reference to “coastal communities” here includes all communities that face
flooding, storm surge, and other risks associated with rising seas, and therefore
includes estuarine, riverine, and some lakeside communities, among others.
40. See WGII SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 29, at 23 (showing even
highly adapted North American communities will face medium to high risks under
scenarios of global mean temperature increases at 2°C and 4°C above preindustrial
levels).
41. SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, CHANGING OUR WAYS: SCOTLAND’S CLIMATE CHANGE
PROGRAMME
76
(2006),
available
at
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/
100896/0024396.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PQY-TQD7]; see also Robin Kundis Craig,
“Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change
Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 9 (2010) (“While there is no question that
successful mitigation strategies remain critical in the quest to avoid worst-case climate
change scenarios, we have passed the point where mitigation efforts alone can deal
with the problems that climate change is creating.”).
42. See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 11; infra note 97 & accompanying text.
43. See infra Part III.A.
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A. Municipal Governments and Mitigation
With respect to mitigation, 2014 marked a shift in the
recognition of the role of cities. In 2014, the IPCC issued its
Fifth Assessment Report (“AR5”), which included for the first
time in the Mitigation of Climate Change volume of its
assessment report a separate chapter on urban areas, referred
to in the chapter title as “human settlements.”44 According to
the IPCC, “[s]ince the publication of the Fourth Assessment
Report, there has been a growing recognition of the significant
contribution of urban areas to GHG emissions, their potential
role in mitigating them, and a multi-fold increase in the
corresponding scientific literature.”45
Clearly, local regulations and activities have the potential to
significantly impact global emissions levels. In addition to
wielding regulatory authority over land uses, building design,
and transportation, local governments tend to maintain
sizeable fleets of motor vehicles; own and lease extensive
building stock; own or operate solid waste transfer stations,
landfills, sewage treatment plants, and power plants;
collectively expend millions of dollars annually in product
procurement; and can influence or control the source of power
used in the municipality.46 Additionally, the impact of local
government regulations and conduct is growing as the world
population continues to concentrate in cities. As of 2011, more
than half the global population was urban, as compared to only
13% in 190047; additionally, urban areas account for
approximately 75% of global energy use and the same amount
of CO2 emissions.48 By 2050, the global urban population is

44. K.C. SETA ET AL., CH. 12: HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND SPATIAL
PLANNING, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (O. Edenhofer et al. eds., 2014)
[hereinafter CH. 12: HUMAN SETTLEMENTS].
45. Id. at 929.
46. Healy & Barry, supra note 35, at 375–76. I use “local government” and
“municipality” interchangeably. Municipalities are political subdivisions, including
cities, towns, villages, and districts such as school districts and sewer districts.
Municipality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available at http://thelaw
dictionary.org/municipality/ [http://perma.cc/QTT5-5B5C].
47. CH. 12: HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, supra note 44, at 929.
48. Id.
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projected to grow by between 2.5 to 3 billion, corresponding to
nearly 70% of the world’s population.49
Despite the “significant contribution of urban areas to GHG
emissions [and] their potential role in mitigating them,”50 as
well as the laudable efforts of many cities,51 AR5 also found
that “[t]housands of Cities are undertaking climate action
plans, but their aggregate impact on urban emissions is
uncertain (robust evidence, high agreement).”52 Although this
finding could be construed as support for the normative
position that climate change mitigation is not an appropriate
pursuit for local governments,53 the uncertain aggregate impact
of thousands of cities’ mitigation efforts probably does not
indicate that local governments are somehow inherently less
able to meaningfully reduce GHG emissions than state, federal
or international entities. Rather, the finding instead likely
indicates the need for more and different action at the local
government level,54 more support and coordination between
levels of government,55 and more transparency and
accountability.56
B. Municipal Governments and Adaptation
In the United States, municipal governments have made
significant contributions to adaptation planning and
implementation, at least as compared to the federal and state
governments. However, U.S. municipalities lag behind their
49. Id. at 942.
50. Id. at 929.
51. See, e.g., supra note 15 (identifying U.S. municipalities that participated in a
CO2 reduction project that began in 1991).
52. CH. 12: HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, supra note 44, at 929.
53. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, State Eyes on the Climate Policy Prize, 27 ENVTL. F.
16, 16 (July/Aug. 2010) (arguing that state and local climate change mitigation
“make[s] no sense”); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007). But see Jonathan
Rosenbloom, Urban Community Collaborative, in Adams-Schoen et al., supra note 5, at
10039 (posing the question “But if the international community is unable to act and
there is a willingness among local governments to act, then why not allow them to do
so?”).
54. See infra Part III.F (discussing the relatively small number of local governments
undertaking climate action planning and the even smaller number of local
governments that have moved from planning to implementation).
55. See infra Part III.F (discussing the lack of local-state-federal integration).
56. See infra Part III.F (discussing the need for increased transparency).
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counterparts throughout the world,57 and, although many
sources laud the extensive work of local governments with
respect to adaptation,58 little attention has been focused on a
troubling
gap
that
exists
between
climate-related
vulnerabilities and local preparedness.
According to a survey administered by ICLEI in 2011, the
United States has the lowest percentage of cities pursuing
adaptation planning out of all regions surveyed (59%), while
Latin American and Canadian cities have the highest (95% and
92% respectively).59 Of particular concern, only 13% of the U.S.
cities surveyed had even completed an assessment of their
vulnerabilities and risks, the lowest percentage of all regions
surveyed.60
In its most recent assessment report, the IPCC identified a
laundry list of potentially catastrophic risks (or “impacts”)
consistent with the gap between vulnerability and local
preparedness:
Impacts from recent climate-related extremes, such as heat
waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires, reveal significant
vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystems and many human
systems to current climate variability (very high confidence).
Impacts of such climate-related extremes include alteration of
ecosystems, disruption of food production and water supply,
damage to infrastructure and settlements, morbidity and
mortality, and consequences for mental health and human wellbeing. For countries at all levels of development, these impacts
are consistent with a significant lack of preparedness for current
climate variability in some sectors.61

In response to this vulnerability-preparedness gap, the IPCC
highlights the importance of “city and municipal governments
acting now to incorporate climate change adaptation into their
development
plans
and
policies
and
infrastructure
57. ICLEI 2011 SURVEY, supra note 11.
58. See, e.g., IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 107 (2014), available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf [http://
perma.cc/A7WN-49YJ] (“There is a significant increase in the number of planned
adaptation responses at the local level in rural and urban communities of developed
and developing countries since the AR4.”).
59. ICLEI 2011 SURVEY, supra note 11, at 14.
60. Id. at 10.
61. WGII SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 29, at 6.
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investments,”62 characterizing “[a]ction in urban centers [as]
essential to successful global climate change adaptation.”63
This characterization of local government action as essential
to disaster preparedness planning makes sense given that
“[l]ocal land use authority is the foundation of the planning
that determines how communities and natural resources are
developed and preserved, and how disaster resilient
communities are created.”64 As Patricia Salkin explains:
Across the country, local governments maintain day-to-day
responsibility and control over the use of the vast majority of
lands that abut the nation’s edge and other environmentally
sensitive areas.
Land use patterns are determined,
infrastructure is designed and provided, and many other
development issues are decided at the local level, where natural
hazards are experienced and losses are suffered most directly.65

Indeed, local governments have an array of tools in their
toolbox that can help adapt their communities to climate
change-related conditions including building codes; land use,
zoning, and subdivision regulations; comprehensive, capital
improvement, transportation, floodplain management, stormwater management, and open space plans; facilities needs
studies; population growth and future development studies;
and economic development plans.66 Thus, it may not be
surprising that a national survey of public and private
emergency managers, code specialists, and engineers found

62. Aromar Revi et al., Urban Areas, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 541
(C.B. Field et al. eds., 2014), available at https://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/
WGIIAR5-Chap8_FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/ULJ9-LN64].
63. Id. at 538; see also THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE U.S. MAYORS
CLIMATE PROTECTION AGREEMENT 2 (2014) (adding new focus on urban resiliency),
available
at
http://usmayors.org/climateagreement/Final%20USCM%202014%20
Mayors%20Climate%20Protection%20Agreement.pdf [http://perma.cc/CNL4-8AWR].
64. John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation Through Land Use Strategies, 23 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 959, 976–77 (2006).
65. Patricia Salkin, Sustainability at the Edge: The Opportunity and Responsibility
of Local Governments to Most Effectively Plan for Natural Disaster Mitigation, 38
ENVT’L L.R. 10158, 10159 (2008).
66. Id. at 10162–69 (discussing sustainability tools in local government toolbox).
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that building codes and land use planning ranked as the most
effective tool to achieve hazards vulnerability reduction.67
Municipal regulation of the form and placement of building
stock in particular offers an opportunity to create more
resilient infrastructure and patterns of development; whereas,
failure to proactively plan for climate change will result in
further investment in infrastructure and patterns of
development that, at best, fail to adapt to hazards, and, at
worst, exacerbate hazards. For example, law and policy
makers must take a hard look at waterfront development plans
and related regulations68 to assess whether development and
rebuilding is being allowed or even encouraged in areas that
are currently vulnerable or will become vulnerable within the
life of the development, and whether the development is
increasing the vulnerability of adjacent areas. On a more
mundane, but still significant level, structure elevation
requirements should be amended to reduce the vulnerability of
the structure throughout its entire useful life, not just for the
next five, ten or twenty years.69 Relatedly, existing local zoning
and building codes should be assessed to determine whether
they impose requirements on the construction of elevated
structures that increase local flood risk by, for example,
increasing the impermeable surface area of the lot.70 Because
67. Id. at 10158.
68. See infra Part III.B.
69. Many flood-prone communities rebuilding after a flood or storm surge event are
requiring elevation of structures.
See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY BUILDING CODE
(“NYCBC”), app. G, § 304.1.1 (2014), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dob/
apps/pdf_viewer/viewer.html?file=2014CC_BC_Chapter_1_Administration.pdf&section
=conscode_2014 [http://perma.cc/KCN8-V27C] (requiring 1–2 family residences be
flood-proofed to 2 feet above Base Flood Elevation).
70. For example, addition of lengthy switchback ramps and stairs needed to access
an elevated first floor may increase the impermeable area of the structure. See, e.g., id.
at § 302.1.1 (requiring 30 feet of ramp for a 30 inch rise). Depending on the amount of
stairs or ramping required to access the elevated structure, the structure may need to
be shifted back from the street, thereby occupying space that had previously been the
backyard. See, e.g., CITY OF NEW YORK, COASTAL CLIMATE RESILIENCY: RETROFITTING
BUILDINGS FOR FLUID RISK 42–43 (2014).
See also OREGON DEP’T OF LAND
CONSERVATION, WATER QUALITY MODEL CODE AND GUIDE BOOK 4.44 (2000), available
at
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/Pages/waterqualitygb.aspx
[http://perma.cc/65HR8XVY] (discussing disruptions caused by building impervious surfaces in floodplains);
Christopher P. Konrad, Effects of Urban Development on Floods, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY (Nov. 2003), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs07603/pdf/fs07603.pdf [http://perma.cc/
Q73Q-LFBT].
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we can anticipate the addition of substantial new building
stock and infrastructure over the next few decades, local
governments that regulate the placement and, in some
respects, design aspects of building stock have an opportunity
to avoid locking in infrastructure that increases flood and other
climate-related risks.71
Indeed, given the clear role for local governments in
adaptation planning and implementation,72 some scholars and
commentators question whether local governments will soon
face liability for failure to plan for and implement climate
change adaptation measures.73 Because the consequences of
destructive storms are foreseeable and at least in part
attributable to failures in the legal system, Maxine Burkett
argues that local governments could face tort liability for
failure to adapt to climate change.74 She posits that although
no affirmative duty exists for governments to provide
protection from natural hazards, once a local government
begins instituting adaptation measures, that action triggers a
duty to adapt reasonably under the circumstances and failure
to do so can result in liability for negligence.75
71. John R. Nolon, The Land Use Stabilization Wedge Strategy: Shifting Ground to
Mitigate Climate Change, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6 (2009)
(reporting that sixty-six percent of the buildings in existence in the United States by
the year 2050 are projected to be built between now and then).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Maxine Burkett, Duty and Breach in an Era of Uncertainty: Local
Government Liability for Failure to Adapt to Climate Change, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV.
775, 780–81 (2013).
74. Id. at 780–81; see also Daniel Farber, Symposium Introduction: Navigating the
Intersection of Environmental Law and Disaster Law, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1783, 1786
(2011) (“[E]nvironmental disasters stem from gaps in environmental regulation: weak
protection of wetlands, badly planned infrastructure, and, above all, climate
change . . . .”).
75. Burkett, supra note 73, at 780–81; see also Jenna Shweitzer, Climate Change
Legal Remedies: Hurricane Sandy and New York City Coastal Adaptation, 16 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 243, 246–47 (2014) (applying Maxine Burkett’s tort liability argument to
New York City, concluding the City would not face liability for failure to adapt
reasonably, and arguing that New York common law signals to local governments that
property owners bear the risks of failure to adapt to natural hazards); Christopher
Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L.
REV. 345, 388–406 (2014) (arguing that regulatory failure to protect property in the
face of climate change can amount to an unconstitutional taking); St. Bernard Parish
Gov’t v. U.S., No. 05-1119L, 2015 WL 2058969, at *1 (Fed. Cl. May 1, 2015) (holding
that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers failure to adequately maintain a flood protection
system exacerbated flood damage from Hurricane Katrina and several subsequent
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So far, in the United States, plaintiffs’ claims against local
governments have not extended to negligent failure to adapt to
climate change. Rather, plaintiffs injured by flooding have
brought actions against local governments alleging that the
municipalities’ negligent design, construction, or operation of
flood control structures caused the plaintiffs’ injuries,76 and, in
at least one instance, plaintiffs injured by flooding brought an
action against a county government claiming that the county’s
negligent regulation of development on an adjacent property
caused plaintiffs’ damages.77 With respect to the former
actions, liability has tended to hinge on whether the
municipality’s conduct was statutorily immune,78 and, if it was
not, whether the plaintiffs proffered sufficient proof of
negligence and causation.79 With respect to the latter action,
the court held that the county owed no duty to homeowners to

storms, and, although temporary, resulted in a taking of private property without just
compensation in violation of the Takings Clause).
76. See, e.g., Vermef v. City of Boulder City, 80 P.3d 445, 445 (Nev. 2003), abrogated
by ASAP Storage, Inc. v. City of Sparks, 173 P.3d 734 (Nev. 2007); Walter Legge Co. v.
City of Peekskill, 619 N.Y.S.2d 771, 771–72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
77. See, e.g., Cootey v. Sun Inv., Inc., 718 P.2d 1086, 1088–89 (Haw. 1986); see also
Courtenay Thompson, Settlement Reached on the Capes, OREGONIAN, Dec. 24, 1999
(reporting on settlement of lawsuit by homeowners against developers in a case
resulting from houses dropping into the ocean and others being condemned as a result
of erosion from waves).
78. See, e.g., Vermef, 80 P.3d at 553 (ruling on appeal of summary judgment that
city was not entitled to immunity for damages occurring during flood under statute
immunizing government entities from liability arising out of emergency management
activities where damage was due to pre-emergency installation of the drainage
channel), abrogated by ASAP Storage, 80 P.3d at 744–45 (ruling that statute
immunizing government from liability relating to emergency management activities
creates immunity for emergency responses and emergency preparation activities); see
also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the government was immunized against claims for flooding damage); In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 802, 807 (E.D. La. 2008) (ruling that
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether damage from flooding was caused
by governmental negligence in design, construction, maintenance, and operation of a
navigational channel, including resulting destruction of flood-mitigating wetlands, as
opposed to negligence with regard to federal flood control project, which would be
subject to statutory governmental immunity).
79. Walter Legge Co., 210 A.D.2d at 317 (affirming order granting judgment as
matter of law for city where there was insufficient proof of causation and negligence in
action against city for damage to property allegedly caused by flooding when natural
waterway used as part of municipal drainage system overflowed).
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ensure that development of an adjoining subdivision would not
create a risk of flooding the homeowners’ property.80
II. NEW YORK CITY’S CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE INITIATIVES
A. New York City and Climate Change: The “New Normal”81
Illustrating the “significant lack of preparedness for current
climate variability”82 characteristic of the majority of U.S.
cities,83 New York was dealt a massive, crippling blow by Super
A number of
Storm Sandy on October 29, 2012.84
idiosyncrasies—namely, timing, size and path—combined to
make Sandy the City’s most extreme storm on record since
1900 in terms of scale and scope of devastation and, arguably,
surge height.85 The tidal surge flooded the New York Port
Authority Trans-Hudson subway tunnels, the New York
subways, and the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel86; 44 New Yorkers
lost their lives87; 6,500 patients were evacuated from hospitals
and nursing homes; nearly 90,000 buildings were in the

80. Cootey, 718 P.2d at 1086.
81. In the foreword to the PlaNYC 2013 Progress Report, Mayor Bloomberg
lamented, “we are sobered by the ‘new normal’ that climate change is producing in our
city, including more frequent and intense summer heat waves and more destructive
coastal storms like Hurricane Sandy.” CITY OF NEW YORK, PLANYC PROGRESS REPORT
2013: A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK 4 (2013) [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT 2013],
http://nytelecom.vo.llnwd.net/o15/agencies/planyc2030/pdf/planyc_progress_report_201
3.pdf [http://perma.cc/X4P3-9WAG].
82. WGII SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 29, at 6.
83. See e.g., ICLEI 2011 SURVEY, supra note 11.
84. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 40.
85. Id. at 21. But see STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 16 (arguing that Sandy’s
surge height has been misreported as 14 feet at the Battery and that Sandy’s peak
storm surge was actually 9 feet). Sandy’s surge combined with high tide to produce
flood levels of 14 feet above the mean lower low water line (“MLLW”) at the Battery,
and 8.99 feet above the mean higher high water line (“MHHW”) at the Battery. Id.; see
also infra Part III.A (discussing the City’s narrative about the toughness of the storm
versus the toughness of New Yorkers).
86. Id. at 14.
87. Stronger, More Resilient reported that the storm caused the death of 43 City
residents. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 13. This number was later
changed to 44. See ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 19. The vast majority
of the deaths were from drowning in areas where waters rose rapidly as a result of the
storm surge. Of these deaths, 23 occurred in Staten Island, including 10 in the
neighborhood of Midland Beach, and the remainder occurred in Queens, Brooklyn and
Manhattan. Victims ranged in age from two years old to 90. STRONGER, MORE
RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 13–14.
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inundation zone88; 1.1 million children were unable to attend
school for a week89; nearly 2 million people were without
power90; the storm shut down access to New York City by
highway, rail and air for almost a week91; related power
outages lasted for weeks in some areas92; and, the storm caused
an estimated $19 billion in damage.93
Severe storms and other climate-related impacts are
expected to continue to manifest and increase in intensity as a
result of the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere.94
Cynthia Rosenzweig, co-chairperson of the second New York
City Panel on Climate Change (“NPCC2”), identified
“compelling areas of linkage between Super Storm Sandy and
climate change, including rising sea levels that made storm
surges higher.”95 Moreover, although scientists debate whether
climate change caused Super Storm Sandy, scientists tend to
agree that climate change contributed to the severity of the
storm96 and will result in more extreme storms in the future.97
As Strauss et al. of Climate Central observe:
88. “More than 400 New York City Housing Authority buildings containing
approximately 35,000 housing units lost power, heat, or hot water during Sandy.”
STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 14.
89. Id. at 11.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 17.
92. Id. at 14.
93. Id. at 11.
94. See NEW YORK CITY PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION
2013: OBSERVATIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTIONS, AND MAPS 15 (Cynthia
Rosenzweig and William Solecki eds., 2013) [hereinafter “NPCC2”], http://www.nyc.
gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/npcc_climate_risk_information_2013_report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q2GG-YTQB].
95. Burkett, supra note 73, at 781 (citing Colin Sullivan, Columbia University Panel
Urges Quick Action to Plan ‘Coastal City for the Future,’ CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 20, 2012),
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2012/11/20/archive/5?terms=colin+sullivan [http://
perma.cc/62B3-KFQM]).
96. See NPCC2, supra note 94, at 7 (“While it is not possible to attribute any single
extreme event such as Hurricane Sandy to climate change, sea level rise already
occurring in the New York City area, in part related to climate change, increased the
extent, and magnitude of coastal flooding during the storm.”).
97. Id. at 8 (“Although hurricanes depend on a range of climate variables and it is
not clear how all these variables will change, a number of recent studies suggest that
the number of the most intense hurricanes may increase globally. It is more likely
than not that these hurricanes will also increase in the North Atlantic Basin.”)
(internal footnote and citations omitted). See also Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., Building
the Knowledge Base for Climate Resiliency: New York City Panel on Climate Change
2015 Report, 1336 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 11 (2015) [hereinafter “NPCC 2015”],
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[E]very coastal flood today is already wider, deeper and more
damaging because of the roughly 8 inches (IPCC 2013) of
warming-driven global sea level rise that has taken place since
1900. [Climate Central’s 2014] analysis finds that this rise has
already increased the annual chance of extreme coastal floods in
New York City by 50%. Looking forward under a fast sea level
rise scenario, [Climate Central] compute[s] a 3-in-4 chance of
historically unprecedented coastal flooding in New York City by
2100—or a 1-in-10 chance under a slow rise scenario.98

By the 2080s, NPCC2’s projections suggest that sea level
changes alone will “lead[] to . . . between a doubling and an
approximately 10- to 15-fold increase in the frequency of the
current 100-year coastal flood . . . .”99
As a result of climate-related factors and land subsidence,
sea level in New York City has risen 1.1 feet since 1900,
approximately 1.2 inches per decade—a rate that is nearly two
times the global average.100 According to NPCC2, an ongoing
body established by New York City law to regularly update and
report on region-specific climate data and projections, sea level
rise is projected to accelerate as the century progresses, rising
in New York City 11 to 21 inches by the 2050s, 18 to 39 inches
by the 2080s, and as much as 6 feet by 2100 (over average
2000–2005 levels).101
available
at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nyas.12591/epdf
[http://
perma.cc/99B2-HZKH] (concluding that it is more likely than not that the number of
intense hurricanes and the intensity of precipitation from these hurricanes will
increase in the North Atlantic Basin). NPCC 2015 presents the work of the NPCC
from January 2013 to January 2015, which, among other things, documents recently
observed climate trends and climate projections for the region up to 2100, compares the
NPCC2 methods and projections to those done by AR5, provides new maps for 100- and
500-year coastal flood events in the 2020s, 2050s, 2080s and 2100, incorporates
analyses of public health issues, and sets forth a “process for developing a system of
indicators and monitoring to track data related to climate change hazards, risks,
impacts, and adaptation strategies.” Id. at 9.
98. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 11.
99. NPCC 2015, supra note 97, at 11. A “100-year coastal flood” is “a flood with a
1% annual chance of occurrence” and a “500-year coastal flood” is a “flood with a 0.2%
annual chance of occurrence.” Id. at 9.
100. NPCC2, supra note 94, at 8 (finding that approximately 45% of the observed
sea level rise of 1.2 inches per decade since 1900 is due to land subsidence, with the
remaining sea level rise driven by climate-related factors).
101. NPCC 2015, supra note 97, at 11. See also infra Part III.D (discussing the
City’s robust, transparent, and science-based data collection, analysis and
benchmarking initiatives).
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To put these projections in perspective, consider that, with
only a 1.5-foot sea level rise, another storm like Sandy could
require New York City to evacuate as many as three million
people.102 With a three-foot rise in sea level, major storms
could inundate low-lying shore communities in Brooklyn,
Queens, Staten Island, and Long Island, shut down the City’s
transportation system, flood the highways, and render the
tunnels into the City impassable.103 An even greater sea level
rise, which appears possible by mid- to late-century given the
continued pace of GHG emissions, “would place much of the
city underwater—and beyond the reach of any protective
measures.”104 Obviously, such conditions would cost lives,
cause property damage and business losses, harm the
environment and threaten public health. In economic terms,
former Mayor Bloomberg recently predicted, “while Sandy
caused about $19 billion in losses for [New York City], rising
sea levels and ocean temperatures mean that by the 2050s, a
storm like Sandy could cause an estimated $90 billion in losses
(in current dollars).”105
Nor are storms and flooding the only, or even the worst,
foreseeable effects of climate change on New York City.
NPCC2 predicts that by 2050 the City could have as many days
at or above ninety degrees annually as Birmingham, Alabama
currently has.106 Heat waves are also predicted to more than
triple in frequency and last on average one and a half times
longer than they do today.107 Compounding this, heat indices
are also projected to increase.108 “The combination of high
temperatures and high humidity can produce severe additive
102. The second NPCC report’s future flood maps illustrate how projected sea-level
rises will expose additional areas of New York City to flooding during extreme storm
events. See NPCC2, supra note 94, at 25.
103. Id.
104. Bruce Stutz, New York City Girds Itself for Heat and Rising Seas, YALE ENV’T
360 (Sept. 10, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2187 [http://perma.cc/
5UTE-5LRE] (discussing the results of the first NPCC report).
105. Michael R. Bloomberg, Foreword to CITY OF NEW YORK, PLANYC: A STRONGER,
MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK 40 (June 2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
sirr/html/report/report.shtml [http://perma.cc/EF53-EJYN].
106. See NPCC2, supra note 94, at 20. NPCC2 projects mean annual temperatures
to increase by 4.1 to 5.7°F by the 2050s and by 5.3 to 8.8°F by the 2080s. NPCC 2015,
supra note 97, at 10.
107. NPCC2, supra note 94, at 19.
108. Id. at 22.

2015]

Sink or Swim

453

effects by restricting the human body’s ability to cool itself and
thereby induce heat stress.”109 Given that heat waves kill more
Americans each year than all other natural disasters
combined,110 the need to address the causes of increasing
temperatures and heat indices is great.
Ultimately, NPCC2 concludes that “although there remain
significant uncertainties regarding long-term climate change,
the [most recent projections and analyses in the] NPCC 2015
report support[] the large body of evidence indicating that
decision-makers are better served by consideration of the
future climate risks rather than reliance on the climate of the
past in development of resiliency and rebuilding programs.”111
B. New York City Takes a Comprehensive Approach to Climate
Change
Heeding the sobering data and dire predictions for its
massive coastal population,112 New York City is taking a
comprehensive approach to climate change mitigation and
adaptation. The City is collecting, analyzing and publishing
climate change-related data and planning for more massive
storm surges, heavy rains and winds, major heat waves and
other extreme weather conditions. The City is also taking
numerous proactive steps to decrease GHG emissions and
otherwise mitigate its contribution to climate change.113 What
follows is a summary of some of the City’s key adaptation and
mitigation initiatives.114

109. Id.
110. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 26.
111. NPCC 2015, supra note 97, at 16.
112. But see generally infra Part III (discussing whether New York City is taking
sufficient resilience measures to protect its coastal population).
113. Indeed, New York City is attacking climate change mitigation and resiliency
from so many different angles that simply locating and navigating the different
initiatives and challenges is a feat unto itself. Initiatives not addressed in this article
include, among others, the City’s air quality initiatives and Sustainable Stormwater
Management Plan. Reports on these initiatives and many others are available at the
City’s Publications website. See PlaNYC Publications, supra note 28.
114. The City provides downloadable copies of more than a dozen reports on its
sustainability initiatives, including benchmarking reports and reports on climate
resilience. See generally PlaNYC Home, MAYOR’S OFFICE OF RECOVERY & RESILIENCY,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/home/home.shtml [http://perma.cc/B6M4-JD6B]
(last visited June 26, 2015).
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1. Long-Term Comprehensive Sustainability Planning That
Includes Climate Change Mitigation
In 2007, Mayor Michael Bloomberg launched PlaNYC and
the Mayor’s Office published a report entitled PlaNYC: A
Greener, Greater New York, which laid out the City’s long-term
comprehensive sustainability goals, including the goal of
reducing the City’s GHG emissions 30% below 2005 levels by
2030 (“30 by 30”), and 126 initiatives to reach this and other
goals, including the establishment of the Mayor’s Office of
Long-Term Planning and Sustainability.115 In 2011, the City
updated A Greener, Greater New York with new initiatives that
placed an even greater emphasis on climate change resilience
in response to weather changes that the City observed were
already taking place.116 Following Super Storm Sandy, the
City published A Stronger, More Resilient New York, which
contained a comprehensive assessment of the City’s climate
change vulnerabilities and a detailed adaptation and
mitigation plan.117 In September 2014, Mayor de Blasio
announced the formation of the new Mayor’s Office of Recovery
and Resiliency and the City’s commitment to increase its GHG
emissions-reduction target from 30% below 2005 levels by 2030
(“30 by 30”) to 80% below 2005 levels by 2050 (“80 by 50”), in
conjunction with publication of One City, Built to Last, a
detailed plan for achieving two-thirds of the City’s additional
CO2 emissions reductions through increases in building
efficiency.118
Since the publication of PlaNYC: A Greener, Greater New
York in 2007, the City has launched, among other things, the
country’s first municipal brownfields cleanup program and an
innovative green infrastructure program; implemented its
Greener Greater Buildings Plan, Clean Heat program, climate
resilience initiatives, Million Trees program and Green
Infrastructure Plan; launched an ambitious suite of policies to
reduce energy use in large buildings; passed regulations to
115. See generally ICLEI PLANYC CASE STUDY, supra note 30, at 5 (evaluating New
York City’s comprehensive long-term sustainability planning process).
116. Numerous related New York City publications, including the 2007 and 2011
Greener, Greater New York reports and annual progress reports are available at
PlaNYC Publications, supra note 28.
117. See STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7.
118. See ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 20.
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phase out highly polluting fuel oil; developed updated climate
impact projections; and passed the City’s Zone Green Zoning
Text amendment.119 The City has invested in a fleet of more
than 600 plug-in electric vehicles and 153 charging stations, is
testing electric taxis, is adding chargers to ten of its public
parking lots, and passed a law in 2014 that requires 20% of
new off street parking to be built “charger ready.”120 As a
result of these and other measures, the City achieved a 19%
reduction in GHG emissions from 2005 levels as of 2014.121
2. Climate Change Resilience and Coastal Protection
Planning
New York City’s New Waterfront Revitalization Program
(“local WRP” or “LWRP”), administered by the Department of
City Planning (“DCP”), is the City’s principal coastal zone
management tool. In accordance with New York State’s WRP
and the federal Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”), New
York City adopted its first local WRP in 1982.122 The current
LWRP policies were adopted by the City Council in 1999 in the
“New Waterfront Revitalization Program,” and became
effective upon state and federal approval in 2002.123 The City
Council approved amendments to the 2002 LWRP in October
2013, which will become effective upon approval by the New
York State Department of State and concurrence by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. The LWRP currently in effect sets
forth ten policies designed to maximize the benefits derived
119.
120.
121.
122.

PROGRESS REPORT 2013, supra note 81, at 6.
PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24, at 18.
Id. at 51.
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, THE NEW WATERFRONT
REVITALIZATION PROGRAM 3 (2002) [hereinafter “NYC LWRP”], available at http://
www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/wrp/wrp_full.pdf [http://perma.cc/TEU9-8B8C]. New York
City’s local waterfront revitalization plan (“WRP”) is authorized by New York State’s
Waterfront Revitalization of Coastal Areas and Inland Waterways Act, N.Y. Exec. Law
§§ 910–923 (2015), which stems from the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1451–1464 (2014). The implementing regulations of the New York statute
and coastal area policies can be found in the Department of State regulations, N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 600.
123. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, THE NEW YORK CITY WATERFRONT
REVITALIZATION PROGRAM: NEW YORK CITY APPROVED REVISIONS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 197-A OF THE CITY CHARTER 5 (2013) [hereinafter “NYC REVISED LWRP”],
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/wrp/revisions/nyc_wrp_city_approved.pdf
[http://
perma.cc/XT2P-PPNR] (discussing history of New York City’s LWRP and New LWRP).
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from economic development, environmental preservation and
public use of the waterfront, while minimizing the conflicts
All city, state, and federal
among those objectives.124
discretionary actions in the coastal zone must be reviewed for
consistency with these policies.125 Notably, the 2002 LWRP’s
objectives do not include coastal resilience and nowhere in the
2002 LWRP is climate change or sea level rise discussed.
However, on October 30, 2013, the City approved a series of
revisions to its LWRP in order to advance the goals laid out in
Vision 2020: The New York City Comprehensive Waterfront
Plan (“Vision 2020”),126 which is organized around eight goals,
one of which is climate resilience.127 The revised LWRP is
awaiting state and federal approval.128
As part of PlaNYC, in December 2012, the City convened the
Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (“SIRR”) to
address long-term climate change resilience specifically in the
wake of Super Storm Sandy.129 Six months later, SIRR

124. NYC LWRP, supra note 122, at 3. The ten policies address: (1) residential and
commercial redevelopment; (2) water-dependent and industrial uses; (3) commercial
and recreational boating; (4) coastal ecological systems; (5) water quality; (6) flooding
and erosion; (7) solid waste and hazardous substances; (8) public access; (9) scenic
resources; and (10) historical and cultural resources. Id. at 8.
125. Id. at 3; see also infra Part III.B (discussing local, state and federal consistency
review).
126. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, VISION 2020: NEW YORK CITY
COMPREHENSIVE WATERFRONT PLAN 5 (March 2011) [hereinafter “VISION 2020”],
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/cwp/vision2020_nyc_cwp.pdf [http://
perma.cc/MXZ6-Z96W].
127. NYC REVISED LWRP, supra note 123, at 6. The eight goals are: expand public
access, enliven the waterfront, support the working waterfront, improve water quality,
restore the natural waterfront, enhance the Blue Network (the waterways themselves),
improve governmental oversight, and increase climate resilience. Id.
128. The City Council approved the amendments to the revised LWRP on October
30, 2013. The revised LWRP will go into effect upon approval by the New York State
Department of State and concurrence by the U.S. Department of Commerce. See The
Waterfront Revitalization Program—Approved by the City Council!
2012 WRP
Revisions, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/
html/wrp/wrp_revisions.shtml [http://perma.cc/7G5M-GKHD] (last visited Apr. 20,
2015) (describing approval process). The public comment period for state approval
closed on February 20, 2015. Following approval by the state, the New York State
Department of State will request incorporation of the City’s LWRP amendment into the
State’s Coastal Management Program by the federal Office for Coastal Management.
Id.
129. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 3.
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released A Stronger, More Resilient New York,130 and DCP
released Designing for Flood Risk and Urban Waterfront
Adaptive Strategies,131 each of which is relevant to the City’s
waterfront management policies.
The coastal protection chapter of A Stronger, More Resilient
New York sets forth the City’s most recent comprehensive
coastal protection plan.132 This plan reviews and rejects the
“silver bullet” of a massive, harbor-wide storm-surge barrier,
and instead proposes a broad range of discrete coastal
protection measures.133 For example, the plan proposes the use
of augmented wetlands, reefs and living shorelines in Jamaica
Bay, Tottenville in Staten Island, Bay Ridge Flats, along the
Arthur Kill and Kill van Kull, and along Long Island Sound.
The plan also recommends the use of hard armoring (i.e.,
protective infrastructures), including local storm surge barriers
in Newtown Creek, Rockaway Inlet and the Gowanus Canal in
Brooklyn. These barriers would consist of large, movable inwater gates connected to levees or floodwalls on adjacent
shores.134 Although the report notes that “ultimately the City
will be best served by implementing the entire suite of options,”
the report claims that implementation of the thirty-seven
“Phase I” measures could reduce expected losses in a Sandy-

130. A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK is a 438-page, 22-chapter report
presenting recommendations for rebuilding the communities affected by Sandy and
increasing the resilience of infrastructure and buildings citywide. Gathering data from
numerous sources, including the NPCC2 report and an economic analysis by the
reinsurance company Swiss Re, the 2013 report projected that, absent implementation
of the SIRR recommendations, by 2050, a storm similar to Sandy would cost New York
City approximately five times as much as Sandy, or $90 billion. Id. at 34.
131. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, DESIGNING FOR FLOOD RISK (June 2013),
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/sustainable_communities/designing_
flood_risk.pdf [http://perma.cc/C5JT-HJTG]; N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, URBAN
WATERFRONT ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES (June 2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dcp/pdf/sustainable_communities/urban_waterfront_print.pdf [http://perma.cc/DQG8GZWB].
132. See STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 50.
133. Id. at 50–65.
134. Id. at 56. The SIRR report also contains six initiatives designed to strengthen
the City’s ability to understand the impacts of climate change, id. at 32, fourteen
initiatives to increase the resilience of the City’s buildings, id. at 79–86, six economic
recovery initiatives, id. at 89–90, ten initiatives for addressing the needs of the
insurance system, id. at 101–03, and twenty-three initiatives for increasing the
resiliency of utilities, id. at 122–29.
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like storm in the 2050s by up to twenty-five percent, or more
than $22 billion.135
The reports released by DCP in June 2013, Designing for
Flood Risk and Urban Waterfront Adaptive Strategies, are
intended to help New York City and other urban waterfront
communities improve their resilience to coastal flood risks.136
Designing for Flood Risk identifies design principles to guide
flood-resistant construction, provides an overview of regulatory
requirements for construction in flood zones under the National
Flood Insurance Program, recommends changes to zoning to
“enable more versatile and desirable design solutions for floodresistant construction,” and “explores the impacts of floodresistant construction standards on built form and the creation
of a vibrant streetscape and public realm.”137
Urban
Waterfront Adaptive Strategies identifies and analyzes
potential adaptive strategies, including interventions inland, at
the shoreline, and in the water.138 Both of these DCP reports
informed A Stronger, More Resilient New York.139 Designing
for Flood Risk also shaped the DCP’s Flood Resilience Text
Amendment.140
3. Local-Scale Climate Models and Risk Analysis
To help respond to climate change in New York City and
accomplish the goals outlined in PlaNYC, the Mayor’s Office
convened the first New York City Panel on Climate Change
(“NPCC1”) in 2008.141 In doing this, New York City became the
first city to scale down the United Nations’ IPCC global climate
models to develop climate-related projections specific to a
municipality.142 In 2009, NPCC1 released a set of climate
projections specific to New York City. Significantly, but
135. Id. at 40.
136. See DESIGNING FOR FLOOD RISK, supra note 131, at 10–11; URBAN
WATERFRONT ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 131, at iii.
137. See DESIGNING FOR FLOOD RISK, supra note 131, at 32.
138. See URBAN WATERFRONT ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 131, at 3.
139. See, e.g., STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 47, 82.
140. See infra Part II.B.5 (summarizing Flood Resilience Text Amendment).
141. Michael R. Bloomberg et al., Climate Change Adaptation in New York City:
Building a Risk Management Response, 1196 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1 (2010).
142. IPCC, the international advisory body on climate change, was formed in 1988
by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment
Programme. See NPCC2, supra note 94, at 34.
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unsurprisingly, NPCC1 concluded that, despite efforts to
reduce GHG emissions, New York City must make substantial
preparations for climate-related changes.143
In September 2012, the City passed Local Law 42, which
established the New York City Panel on Climate Change as an
ongoing body.144 Local Law 42 requires the NPCC to meet at
least twice a year to review scientific data on climate change;
recommend projections for the 2020s, 2050s, and 2080s within
one year of the publication of the IPCC Assessment Reports, or,
at a minimum once every three years; recommend a framework
for stakeholders to incorporate climate change projections into
their planning processes; and advise the City’s Office of LongTerm Planning and Sustainability on a communications
strategy related to climate science.145
Local Law 42 also established a New York City climate
change adaptation task force, “consisting of city, state and
federal agencies and private organizations and entities
responsible for developing, maintaining, operating or
overseeing the city’s public health, natural systems, critical
infrastructure, buildings and economy.”146 Like the NPCC, the
task force is required to meet at least twice a year, and, within
one year of the NPCC’s development of recommended climate
change projections pursuant to Local Law 42, the task force
must create an inventory of potential climate change-related
risks.147
In January 2013, the Mayor’s Office convened the second
New York City Panel on Climate Change (“NPCC2”) to provide
scientific information and analyses on climate risks for use in
143. NPCC, CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 5 (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/om/pdf/2009/NPCC_CRI.pdf [http://perma.cc/AHN8-MAXA].
144. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-122–3-123.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. The task force is also responsible for reviewing the NPCC’s climate change
projections, evaluating potential impacts of climate change on public health, including
delivery of public health services to the city’s vulnerable populations; evaluating the
potential impacts of climate change on the city’s natural systems, critical
infrastructure and buildings; identifying rules, policies and regulations governing
public health, natural systems, critical infrastructure, buildings and economy that may
be affected by climate change; and formulating and updating coordinated strategies to
address the potential impact of climate change on the city’s communities, vulnerable
populations, public health, natural systems, critical infrastructure, buildings and
economy. Id.

460

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 40:3

the SIRR.148 Specifically, the goal of NPCC2 was to “present
climate uncertainties clearly in order to facilitate risk-based
decision-making on the use of policy tools such as incentives,
regulations, and insurance” in order to “make New York City
more resilient to mean changes in climate and to future
extreme events.”149 NPCC2 published reports in June 2013
and February 2015, which provided new climate change
projections and future coastal flood risk maps for New York
City.150
4. NYC Green Codes Task Force
In July 2008, Mayor Bloomberg and City Council Speaker
Christine Quinn asked the New York Chapter of the U.S.
Green Building Council (“USGBC”) to convene the NYC Green
Codes Task Force to review the City’s building and
construction codes and make recommendations on how they
could be amended to promote more sustainable practices. The
task force was asked, among other things, to examine
construction, fire, water and sewer and zoning codes; identify
impediments to the incorporation of green technologies;
identify opportunities to promote energy efficiency and other
sustainable practices; and recommend ways to incorporate
climate adaptation measures into the codes.151
The task force’s more than 200 volunteers152 responded with
111 proposed initiatives, consisting primarily of code additions
or revisions.153
Nine additional recommendations were
148. NPCC2, supra note 94, at 7; see also supra Part II.B.1.
149. NPCC2, supra note 94, at 9.
150. Id. at 4; NPCC 2015 supra note 97, at 9–10.
151. Letter from Michael Bloomberg, Mayor, and Christine Quinn, Speaker of the
Council of the City of New York, to Russell Unger, Executive Director, USGBC New
York (July 8, 2008), in URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, NYC GREEN CODES TASK FORCE:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2010) [hereinafter “NYC GREEN CODES”], available at http://
www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/downloads/pdf/gctf_executive_summary.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
S7HA-FBTF].
152. The volunteers consisted of “architects; engineers; lighting, landscape
architects and interior designers; owners and developers; corporate tenants;
contractors; cost estimators; affordable-housing experts; code specialists; attorneys;
waste haulers; scientists and public-health experts; and representatives of
environmental organizations, building trade unions, city agencies, and industry and
professional associations.” NYC GREEN CODES, supra note 151, at 3.
153. See GCTF Enacted Proposals, PLANYC, http://www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/html/
codes/enacted.shtml [http://perma.cc/7F8D-R8SH] (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (listing
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introduced as bills in the City’s 2014 legislative session.154
Each proposed code amendment or revision includes proposed
statutory language, a detailed explanation of the issues, an
analysis of costs and savings, precedents from other
jurisdictions, a comparison of the proposal to any related
Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design (“LEED”)
credits and information on implementation.155 The proposals
primarily affect new buildings under construction and existing
buildings that are being renovated, but, in some cases, the
proposals focus on upgrading existing buildings.156
As of April 2015, 52 of the 111 proposals had been
implemented and another 4 had been partially implemented.157
The enacted codes include new laws or amendments to existing
law that: (1) add environmental protection as a fundamental
principle of construction codes,158 (2) streamline approvals for
green technologies and projects,159 (3) increase resiliency of
buildings to natural disasters,160 (4) increase energy
efficiency161 and decrease carbon emissions,162 (5) remove

enacted and partially enacted proposals, corresponding legal language, and links to the
proposals).
154. PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24, at 20.
155. See, e.g., URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, NYC GREEN CODES TASK FORCE: FULL
PROPOSALS OC1-1–3 (2010) [hereinafter “NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS”], available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/downloads/pdf/gctf_all_proposals.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
U49A-LBYX].
156. See, e.g., id. at OC3-1 (proposing amendment to building code to require all
buildings to comply with improved environmental and health standards); 2009 N.Y.C.
Local Law No. 85 (enacting the proposed amendment to require all buildings to comply
with improved environmental and health standards).
157. See NYC Green Codes Proposal Tracker, URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, http://urban
greencouncil.org/greencodestracker [http://perma.cc/8CX5-NLNN] (last visited Apr. 20,
2015) (providing status of all 111 proposal and links to applicable legislation, local
laws, and the proposal).
158. 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 49.
159. 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 5.
160. See, e.g., NYCBC, app. G; 2013 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 143 (improving
safeguards for toxic materials stored in flood zones); 2013 NYC Local Law No. 81
(studying and forecasting non-flood climatic hazards to 2080); 2013 N.Y.C., Local Law
79 (ensuring toilets and sinks can operate during blackouts).
161. See, e.g., 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 52 (improving lighting efficiency in
apartment buildings); 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 48 (regarding manual on-automatic
off lighting); 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 47 (regarding the reduction of artificial
lighting in sunlit lobbies and hallways).
162. See, e.g., 2011 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 21 (reducing summer heat with cool roofs);
2013 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 141 (reducing carbon dioxide emissions from specialized
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impediments to alternative energy,163 (6) increase indoor health
and safety,164 (7) increase resource conservation,165 (8) manage
stormwater more sustainably,166 (9) promote sustainable urban
ecological practices,167 and (10) enhance water efficiency.168
5. Zoning Code Amendments
Building on the work of the Green Codes Task Force, on April
30, 2012, the City Council adopted the Zone Green Text
Amendment,169 which amended the City’s Zoning Resolution for
the stated purpose of removing impediments to the
construction and retrofitting of greener buildings.170 The Zone
Green amendments were one of a series of Zoning Resolution
amendments the DCP proposed to promote sustainable
communities and climate change resilience. This series of
amendments also included a Flood Resilience Text

concrete); 2010 ECCCNYS ch. 5 and ASHRAE 90.1 2010 ch. 5 (minimizing air leakage
building exteriors); 1 R.C.N.Y. ch. 5000 (ensuring lighting systems function properly).
163. See, e.g., 63 R.C.N.Y. 1 (removing landmarks impediments to alternative
energy); 2011 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 20 (allowing large solar rooftop installations); 2012
N.Y.C. Local Law No. 28 (increasing allowable size of solar shades); 2010 N.Y.C. Local
Law No. 43 (allowing use of biofuels).
164. See, e.g., 2012 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 2 (limiting harmful emissions from
carpets); 2011 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 71 (requiring the filtering of soot from incoming
air); 15 R.C.N.Y. ch. 2 (phasing out dirty boiler fuels); 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 43
(phasing out dirty boiler fuels); 2011 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 20 (treating corrosive
concrete wastewater); 15 R.C.N.Y. ch. 1 (reducing “red tape” for asbestos removal);
2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 55 (increasing availability of drinking fountains). In
addition, the Federal Formaldehyde Standards for Composite Wood Products Act
enacted in 2010 restricts cancer-causing formaldehyde in building materials. See 15
U.S.C. § 2697 (West 2010).
165. See, e.g., 2012 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 60 (providing recycling areas in apartment
buildings); 2011 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 71 (requiring use of recycled asphalt).
166. See, e.g., 15 R.C.N.Y. ch. 31 (strengthening stormwater run-off management
requirements for new developments).
167. See, e.g., 2013 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 80 (constructing sustainable sidewalks).
168. See, e.g., 2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 57 (enhancing water efficiency standards);
2010 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 56 (catching leaks by measuring water use); 2010 N.Y.C.
Local Law No. 54 (stopping wasting drinking water for cooling).
169. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G, ZONE GREEN TEXT AMENDMENT (enacted Apr. 30,
2012), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/greenbuildings/adopted_text_
amendment.pdf [http://perma.cc/E9S9-DKUP].
170. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G, ZONE GREEN TEXT AMENDMENT HANDOUT 1,
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/greenbuildings/handout.pdf [http://
perma.cc/KA2P-ULJN] (last visited June 26, 2015).
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Amendment, which the City adopted on October 9, 2013.171
The Flood Resilience amendments removed barriers to
constructing and retrofitting for flood resilience based on the
latest flood maps issued by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (“FEMA”).172 The amendments also put
in place measures to mitigate the potential negative effects of
elevated buildings on ground-floor activity and quality of the
streetscape.173 The City also adopted numerous sustainabilityrelated amendments to its Zoning Resolution prior to and
separate from the Zone Green and Flood Resilience
amendments. These include amendments that allow car share
vehicles to park in off-street parking garages and lots in certain
locations174; require indoor, secure, long-term bicycle parking in
new multi-family residential, community facility, and
commercial buildings175; require street tree planting for all new
developments and major enlargements citywide176; and prevent
excessive paving of front yards by encouraging landscaping and
planting of yards.177
III. NEW YORK CITY: A MODEL FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
RESILIENCE?
PlaNYC is far from merely aspirational—it contains concrete
goals such as the 2050 emissions reduction goal and interim
emissions reductions goals, specific implementation strategies,
substantial data analyses projects, an aggressive timeline for
making changes to relevant local laws, and funding strategies.
PlaNYC’s 2013 progress report boasts that “PlaNYC is the
world’s standard for municipal sustainability plans and cities

171. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G., FLOOD RESILIENCE TEXT AMENDMENT, available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/flood_resiliency/final_text.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
A7E2-UWYM] (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
172. Id. at § 12–10.
173. Id. at § 64-00(c).
174. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G. ZONING RESOLUTION AMENDMENT (adopted Sept.
29, 2010), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/allarticles.pdf [http://
perma.cc/B9V3-KH6X].
175. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G. ZONING RESOLUTION AMENDMENT, N 090191
ZRY, § 11-337 (adopted Apr. 22, 2009).
176. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G, ZONING RESOLUTION AMENDMENT, N 080081
ZRY, § 11-336 (adopted Apr. 30, 2008).
177. Id.

464

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 40:3

throughout the world are emulating our work.”178
Notwithstanding significant tensions and challenges, this boast
appears to hold water, at least with respect to communications
and public involvement; data analysis, collection and
transparency; vulnerability assessment; building efficiency
improvements; and development of action-focused plans with
concrete implementation strategies including funding
strategies.179 Despite proactive and laudable policies, the boast
does not hold water, however, with respect to emissions
reductions commitments and coastal zone policies that fail to
fully account for likely near- and medium-term future
hazards—key features of mitigation and adaptation,
respectively.
Thus, a number of New York City initiatives, as well as their
underlying planning processes, provide excellent models for
regional, county and sub-county level resilience planning
efforts. Other of the initiatives take important steps, some of
which are unprecedented in the United States, but
nevertheless fall short of what is likely required to sufficiently
“moderate[] harm” from dangerous interference with the
climate system.180

178. PROGRESS REPORT 2013, supra note 81, at 6.
179. See generally ICLEI PLANYC CASE STUDY, supra note 30, at 7. In 2010, ICLEI
selected PlaNYC as the model for its Sustainability Five Milestone process “because of
the comprehensive scope of the plan, the extensive planning process the City undertook
to analyze issues, and the broad public outreach performed by the City to more than 70
stakeholder groups.” Id. at 9. The Milestones are as follows: conduct a sustainability
assessment, establish sustainability goals, develop a local sustainability plan,
implement policies and measures, and evaluate progress and report results. Id. ICLEI
identified the following as factors that contributed to the success of the plan, inter alia:
a methodical, transparent, and inclusive planning process[; c]entral management
and coordination[; a]n external Sustainability Advisory Board . . . [; a]
comprehensive public outreach process [that] generated broad public support and
helped to educate the general public about climate change and sustainability
issues . . . [; t]he plan included an implementation plan with a timeline and a
funded budget[; and s]wift transition from planning to action.
Id. at 6.
180. See AR4 WGII, supra note 7, at 6 (defining “adaptation”); see also supra note 13
(quoting same).
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A. PlaNYC: A Persuasive Narrative About a Climate Resilient
Future
To the extent “good planning [is] persuasive storytelling
about the future,”181 New York City is doing good resilience
planning. The post-Sandy report, Stronger, More Resilient,
tells a persuasive story of toughness and unity. Threaded
throughout A Stronger, More Resilient New York are messages
about the strength, toughness and machismo of New Yorkers:
The underlying goal of this report is resiliency. That is, to adapt
our city to the impacts of climate change and to seek to ensure
that, when nature overwhelms our defenses from time to time,
we are able to recover more quickly.
In short, we have to be tough.
And toughness, as we all know, is one of the defining traits of
New Yorkers.
In just the first few years of this century, we have been through
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, financial crises and
blackouts, and now, Sandy. With each challenge, we have
become more united as a city.
We must come together again with an even stronger commitment
to slow the progress of climate change while simultaneously
preparing for the changes already evident around us—and those
yet to come.
If we embrace this plan today, we will be positioned to meet the
challenges that climate change may bring tomorrow, and almost
certainly will bring in the years and decades ahead. If we take
action now, we will make New York City stronger, safer, and
more resilient—not only for our own benefit, but for the benefit of
future generations of New Yorkers.
181. Estiri, supra note 36, at 6 (quoting James A. Throgmorton, Planning as
Persuasive Storytelling About the Future:
Negotiating an Electric Power Rate
Settlement in Illinois, 12 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 17 (1992)). See also James A.
Throgmorton, Planning as Persuasive Storytelling in the Context of “the Network
Society,” Presentation at the ACSP-AESOP Third Joint Congress, Leuven, Belgium
(July 8–12,2003), available at http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005
&context=urban_pubs [http://perma.cc/WH26-CH2U] (responding to criticism of claim
that planning is persuasive storytelling and citing other recent treatments of
storytelling in planning).
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The time has come to make our city even tougher.182

The new administration carries the toughness theme forward
with its tag line, “One City, Built to Last,” reminiscent of Ford
Truck’s 1990s ad campaigns (“Built to Last” and “Built Ford
Tough”).183 The underlying message appears to be that “tough
guys” care about climate change, and, ultimately, New
Yorkers—at least if they get on board with the City’s
initiatives—are tougher than climate change. Illustrative of
this, A Stronger, More Resilient New York includes a definition
of “resilient,” which lists as synonyms “New York City” and
“TOUGH.”184
Given systemic climate change denial,185 paralysis at the
federal level,186 and a troubling lack of preparedness in the

182. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 6. The toughness theme is also
reinforced through images. See, e.g., id. at 6.
183. See ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16; see also Tanya Gazdik, Ford
Boosts Ad Spending Behind Jwt’s ‘Built To Last’ Campaign, ADWEEK (Feb. 9, 1998,
12:00 AM), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising/ford-boosts-ad-spending-behindjwts-built-last-campaign-23668 [http://perma.cc/7HN8-KUU8] (discussing introduction
of “Built to Last” tagline, to be used in conjunction with “Built Ford Tough” tag line).
184. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 2.
185. See Global Trends, IPSOS MORI (2014), http://www.ipsosglobaltrends.com/
environment.html [http://perma.cc/V2JP-ZK8E] (finding in a September/October
survey that only 54% of Americans believe “[t]he climate change we are currently
seeing is largely the result of human activity”). The American response to this
question (54%) was 10 points lower than the second lowest percentage of the 20
countries surveyed. Id. Similarly, an Associated Press-GfK poll found only 33% of
Americans were “extremely confident” that the average temperature of the world is
rising due to the existence of heat-trapping greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere. GFK
PUBLIC AFFAIRS & CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS, THE AP-GFK POLL 2 (2014) available
at
http://ap-gfkpoll.com/main/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/AP-GfK-March-2014-PollTopline-Final_SCIENCE.pdf [http://perma.cc/ME5P-3F7H]; see also Lydia Saad, In
U.S., Global Warming Views Steady Despite Warm Winter (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/153608/global-warming-views-steady-despite-warmwinter.aspx [http://perma.cc/4A45-DB4L] (reporting on Gallup annual environmental
poll in which 42% of respondents said reports of climate change are exaggerated); Peter
J. Jacques et al., The Organisation of Denial: Conservative Think Tanks and
Environmental Scepticism, 17 ENVTL. POL. 349, 349 (2008) (linking environmental
skepticism fostered by conservative think tanks to a weakening of US commitment to
environmental policies). Even more troubling, some states are restricting local
government’s ability to pass laws or implement policies on climate change. See, e.g.,
Tristram Korten, In Florida, Officials Ban Term ‘Climate Change,’ FL. CTR. FOR
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Mar. 8, 2015), http://fcir.org/2015/03/08/in-florida-officialsban-term-climate-change/ [http://perma.cc/BA8H-CFK6] (discussing unwritten Florida
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United States,187 the persuasive power of a municipality’s
climate change plan should be considered when assessing the
plan’s effectiveness.
Dan Kahan has urged that
communication at the local level that is consistent with “the
path of least resistance” is not only pragmatic, but is in fact
“morally right.”188 He argues that discussions at the local level
are sufficiently removed from the divisive language of the
national debate “and sufficiently proximate to other meaningpervaded domains . . . to evoke a host of different
associations.”189 Thus, he asserts that, at the local level,
citizens are “speaking in idioms—ones relating to their shared
historical experience, for instance, as people either battered by
violent storms or baked by arid, scorching heat—the familiarity
and logic of which predate climate change.”190
Certainly, the City’s use of a toughness theme appears to
evoke the shared experience of survival and, as a result, the
need for action separate from any politicized discussion of
climate change. Referencing the “September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, financial crises and blackouts,” the City’s resiliency
plan draws on these experiences of extreme hardship and
survival, asserting that “[w]ith each challenge, we have become
more united as a city” and urging New Yorkers to “come
together again with an even stronger commitment to slow the
progress of climate change while simultaneously preparing for
the changes already evident around us—and those yet to
come.”191 This narrative of toughness may be more than just a
public relations device; rather, the narrative, by evoking a
shared experience that predates debate on climate change, may
increase public acceptance of the City’s resilience and
policy prohibiting state officials from using the term “climate change” or “global
warming” in official communications, emails, or reports).
186. See infra Part III.F.2, discussing the lack of federal congressional support of
state and local climate resilience initiatives, noting federal executive actions in this
area, and discussing the need for integration across the local, state and federal levels.
187. See infra notes 395–08 (discussing ICLEI 2011 Survey showing that percentage
of U.S. municipalities to have completed adaptation assessments is lower than any
other region surveyed).
188. Dan M. Kahan, Cognitive Bias and the Constitution, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 367,
408 (2013).
189. Id. at 407.
190. Id.
191. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 6. The toughness theme is also
reinforced through images. See, e.g., id.
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mitigation plans, and indeed may be a lynchpin in their
success.192 But, is it “morally right,” as Kahan urges, to take
the path of least resistance193 when doing so involves a failure
to correct public misperception of the scope of the crisis?
Data and projections from the IPCC, NPCC2 and other
scientists tell us that climate change itself is tough and getting
tougher with each passing day.194 Thus, although the City is
undertaking adaptation and mitigation planning and
implementation initiatives, many of which are unprecedented
in the United States, the City’s “toughness” message may have
the unintended, and potentially significant, harmful
consequence of giving New Yorkers a false assurance of
preparedness and lack of vulnerability. This may be especially
so because the toughness message has been combined with a
narrative that paints Super Storm Sandy as an anomaly. By
referring to Sandy as “the worst natural disaster ever to hit
New York City,”195 the Mayor’s Office may give the mistaken
impression that the storm was both unprecedented and a true
worst-case-scenario—when, in fact, a storm of Sandy’s
magnitude is not unprecedented in the region, and a different
set of circumstances could have made Sandy even more
devastating than it was.196 Since 1900, New York City has
experienced storms with higher winds speeds,197 more rain,198
and peak surges ten feet or higher above mean low tide,199
which, if they hit the City today would have even higher peak

192. See id. at 408 (“[I]nsistence [that the divisive meanings of the national climate
change debate be engrafted onto the local adaptation one] has wrecked attempts to
replicate in North Carolina a constructive form of political engagement with climate
science now unfolding in states like Florida and Virginia.”).
193. Kahan, supra note 188, at 408.
194. See supra Part II.A.
195. See Bloomberg, supra note 105.
196. STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 21.
197. See id. (“[Sandy’s] 80- mile-per-hour (“mph”) peak wind gusts fell well short of
other storms that have hit New York City, including Hurricane Carol in 1954 (up to
125-mph gusts) and Hurricane Belle in 1976 (up to 95-mph gusts).”).
198. Id. (“Previous storms also brought much more rain with them. Sandy dropped
a scant inch in some parts of New York, far less than the 5 inches of rain dropped on
the city during Hurricane Donna in 1960 or the 7.5 inches during the April 2007
nor’easter.”).
199. See id. at 21 (discussing 1821 hurricane (13-foot storm surge) and Hurricane
Donna in 1960 (10-foot storm surge)).
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surges as a result of rising sea levels.200 Moreover, although
circumstances combined to increase Sandy’s devastation,
Sandy itself was not a worst-case scenario. For example, had
Sandy struck at high tide in Western Long Island Sound, as
opposed to near high tide at the Battery, Swiss Re projects that
Sandy’s peak surge would have been four feet higher than it
was.201
Thus, although potentially effective as communication
strategies to garner support of a plan, narratives of toughness
combined with characterizations of Sandy as an anomalous
worst-case-scenario, especially combined with the City’s
voluminous and numerous reports on climate resilience
planning, could lead the public to conclude that their local
government has the problem under control. In addition to
likely being incorrect,202 this perception could lead residents
and business owners to overlook opportunities to contribute to
climate change adaptation (by, for example, installing flood
mitigation measures on their own property) and mitigation (by,
for example, making significant lifestyle changes to reduce
personal energy usage), or make choices that increase their
own or the City’s future vulnerability (by, for example,
purchasing property in a flood zone or rebuilding a structure
with a 80-year useful life based on 10-year sea level rise
projections).203
B. The Super Wicked Problem of Waterfront Development
Public policy scholars characterize as “wicked problem[s]”
policy problems that defy resolution because of “enormous
interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting
stakeholders implicated by any effort to develop a solution.”204
Climate change generally, and the policy conundrum faced by
200. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 11 (noting that storms today are intensified in
terms of surge height and other variables as a result of higher sea levels).
201. See STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 21 (describing projected
impacts under a western Long Island Sound high tide scenario).
202. See supra Part II.A, infra Part III.C (discussing sea level rise and related
projections and likely insufficient mitigation to stay within a 2°C pathway).
203. See generally infra Part III.B (discussing continued waterfront development in
highly vulnerable areas; see also infra note 207 (discussing specific examples of
waterfront development in known risk areas).
204. See Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009).
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municipalities’ regulation of waterfront development in
particular, poses a “super wicked problem.”205 In addition to
obvious economic and political obstacles posed by policies that
involve displacement of residents and businesses and
devaluation of property, major changes in waterfront
development policies also must overcome particularly wicked
obstacles related to the complex intergovernmental web of
laws, regulations and agencies that regulate waterfront areas.
To highlight the wickedness of the waterfront development
problem, consider the repeated dire projections for vulnerable
coastal areas206; continued development of these areas,
including publicly funded development207; the devastation of
these areas during Sandy and other extreme weather events,
including loss of lives, displacement of thousands of residents
and businesses, and massive property and infrastructure
losses208; and political assurances post-Sandy that New Yorkers
are “tougher”209 than climate change and, without question,
“we’ll rebuild it.”210 Indeed, at the same time as the City was
publishing warnings about accelerating sea level rise and
increasing risk from floods and storm surge, the City also
reported in its Clean Waterfront Plan that “New Yorkers are
taking advantage of the waterfront for recreation, housing, and

205. Id. at 1159–60 (arguing that climate change is a “super wicked problem”).
206. See, e.g., NPCC 2015, supra note 97, at 41 (high estimate projection of sea level
rise of 6.25 feet over a 2000 to 2004 base period by the century’s end); Burkett, supra
note 73, at 782 n.46 (citing New York and New Jersey master plans and reports
predicting the growing dangers from continued development).
207. See John Rudolf et al., Hurricane Sandy Damage Amplified by Breakneck
Development of Coast, HUFF. POST (Nov. 12, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/11/12/hurricane-sandy-damage_n_2114525.html [http://perma.cc/VCA83TS4] (“On Staten Island, developers built more than 2,700 mostly residential
structures in coastal areas at extreme risk of storm surge flooding between 1980 and
2008, with the approval of city planning and zoning authorities, according to a review
of city building data by scientists at the College of Staten Island. Some of this
construction occurred in former marshland along the island’s Atlantic-facing south
shore.”).
208. See Sarah Adams-Schoen, On the Waterfront: New York City’s Climate Change
Adaptation and Mitigation Challenge, Part 1, 25 ENVTL. L. N.Y. 81, 82–83 (2014).
209. See supra Part III.A (discussing PlaNYC’s “toughness” narrative).
210. Colleen Curry, NYC Neighborhood Hit Hard by Superstorm Sandy Would
Rather Sell Than Rebuild, ABC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/
superstorm-sandy-hit-neighborhood-smarter-sell-rebuild/story?id=19066168
[http://
perma.cc/FE4X-3DNF] (quoting New Jersey Governor Chris Christie as saying there is
“no question . . . we’ll rebuild it”).
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new business opportunities in record numbers.”211 The City
also reported in its current coastal management plan that
“[n]ew housing on waterfront property has helped the city
accommodate the influx of nearly one million new residents.
Since 1992, [when the City adopted its first waterfront plan,]
more than 20,000 new residential units have been built on
waterfront blocks, with nearly 6,000 additional new units in
the development pipeline.”212
Although governments “do not ordinarily dictate where
people can live, own property, or operate their businesses,”
they can “use sound zoning regulations and natural hazards
management programs, along with appropriate building codes
and practices, to help ensure that people are encouraged to
avoid especially hazardous locations.”213 Governments “can
also enact even stricter requirements for critical facilities, such
as schools and nursing homes, which house particularly
vulnerable populations.”214
Maxine Burkett urges that devastation in vulnerable coastal
areas is a failure of local governments to respond adequately to
known risks:
Instead of rezoning at-risk areas to cease development, . . .
decision makers in New York and New Jersey allowed continued
heavy development of risky coastal areas even though they were
increasingly aware of the potential for “massive storm surge in
the region.” At least two fatalities in Staten Island occurred in
developments completed as recently as the 1990s in coastal areas
at extreme risk of storm surge flooding.215

211. N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW 55 OF 2011: CLEAN WATERFRONT PLAN 4 (2014), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/downloads/pdf/publications/2014_nyc_clean_waterfront
_plan.pdf [http://perma.cc/X7N3-86BX].
212. VISION 2020, supra note 126, at 13.
213. ED THOMAS ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION ASS’N, PLANNING AND
BUILDING LIVABLE, SAFE & SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES: THE PATCHWORK QUILT
APPROACH
7
(2013),
http://nhma.info/uploads/publications/Patchwork%20Quilt
UPDATED.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z6LA-YRH6].
214. Id.; see also Andrea McArdle, Storm Surges, Disaster Planning, and Vulnerable
Populations at the Urban Periphery: Imagining A Resilient New York After Superstorm
Sandy, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 19, 19–41 (2014) (contrasting the harm to vulnerable
populations and infrastructure in the City’s flood zones following Superstorm Sandy
with the City’s policy of rebuilding and continued encouragement of waterfront
development).
215. Burkett, supra note 73, at 782 (citations omitted).

472

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 40:3

Indeed, more than eight years before Super Storm Sandy,
Princeton University reported that the rapid population growth
in New Jersey’s “coastal counties was setting the scene for
monumental environmental damage and property loss.”216
Ultimately, New Jersey suffered economic losses from Super
Storm Sandy estimated at $9 to $15 billion.217
Although the damage from Sandy was catastrophic, it was
not “unthinkable,” as described by New Jersey Governor Chris
Christie.218 Rather, the storm and resulting damages were
foreseeable, and future damaging storms of its magnitude and
of greater magnitude are also foreseeable.219 Thus, New York
City officials—and other municipal leaders considering how to
reduce the mounting toll of floods and other hazards—would be
wise to “keep foremost in [their] minds that the best disaster
response and recovery comes from proper planning, land use,
and building codes that prevent the disaster from ever
happening in the first place.”220
In light of the devastation from Sandy (and before that
Hurricanes Irene and Lee) and the projections of more frequent
and more intense future storms, coastal community planning
must include coordinated multi-jurisdictional efforts “to reduce
or eliminate unnecessary damage caused by human occupancy
of hazardous areas.”221 A Stronger, More Resilient New York,
the City’s post-Sandy catalog of resiliency initiatives, concluded
that “[e]fforts by [the multiple] agencies [with regulatory
authority in the coastal zones] are not completely aligned. This
lack of unified and coordinated regulatory oversight can lead to
delayed and unpredictable waterfront activity, complicating the

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Cavan Sieczkowski, Hurricane Sandy Damage Photos:
Superstorm’s
‘Unthinkable’ Aftermath Revealed (PICTURES), HUFF. POST (Oct. 30, 2012), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/30/hurricane-sandy-damage-photos-superstormunthinkable-aftermath_n_2044099.html [http://perma.cc/JF6D-KDZA] (“Chris Christie
said the wreckage is ‘beyond anything I thought I’d ever see.’ Adding, ‘The level of
devastation at the Jersey Shore is unthinkable,’ according to CNN.”).
219. See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 9, at 11 (projecting increased frequency and
intensity of coastal storms).
220. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 213, at 7.
221. Id. at 6 (warning that “[w]e need to reduce or eliminate unnecessary damage
caused by human occupancy of hazardous areas”).
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achievement of important public goals, including coastal
Without coordination, “the proliferation of
resiliency.”222
programs and initiatives may lead to confusion, potential
diffusion of resources, less than perfect communication within
and among government entities, and missed opportunities.”223
Indeed, the local, state and federal legal and policy
framework governing coastal and estuarine planning and
management is a complicated web that includes more than a
dozen related federal, county, state and local laws implemented
by an even greater number of agencies, departments,
commissions and task forces.224 These include the federal
Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”), Submerged Lands
Act, and Coastal Barrier Resources Act225; the New York State
Waterfront Revitalization of Coastal Areas and Inland
Waterways Act (“NYS CZMA”), Waterfront Revitalization
Program (“WRP”), Tidal Wetlands Act (“TWA”), and Coastal
Erosion Hazard Area Act (“CEHA”)226; and the New York City
New Waterfront Revitalization Program, comprehensive
coastal management plan, the coastal chapter of Stronger,

222. See STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 40 (discussing coordination
challenges).
223. Patricia E. Salkin, New York Climate Change Report Card: Improvement
Needed for More Effective Leadership and Overall Coordination with Local
Government, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 925 (2009).
224. For example, the CZMA implements the national Coastal Zone Management
Program, which is administered federally by the Department of Commerce under the
direction of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) and at
the state level by an agency designated by each state or territory. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1455–
1456; see generally N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G. ZONING RESOLUTION AMENDMENT,
supra note 176. In New York, the Coastal Zone Management Program is implemented
by the Department of State. However, under New York law, a municipality may opt to
adopt a Local Waterfront Revitalization Plan, which is administered by an agency or
department designated by the municipality. 42 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 915 (McKinney
2014); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit. 19, § 601 (2012) (implementing optional
LWRP provisions).
225. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (2006); The Coastal Zone
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (2012); Coastal Barrier Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1452(2)(K) (2006).
226. New York State Waterfront Revitalization of Coastal Areas and Inland
Waterways Act, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 600.1(c) (2012); Tidal Wetlands
Act (TWA), N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 661.1 (2012); New York Coastal
Erosion Hazard Area Act (CEHA), N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 34-0102(5) (McKinney
2012).
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More Resilient, and the City’s Zoning Resolution,227 among
others.
Municipal policies and projects along the City’s
waterways may also be subject to the state’s common law and
statutory public trust doctrine228 as well as federal takings
jurisprudence.229
New York State enacted the NYS CZMA and adopted a state
WRP pursuant to the federal CZMA,230 which offers financial
incentives and management opportunities for participating
waterfront municipalities.231 New York City adopted its LWRP
pursuant to an optional provision of New York law,232 and the
State and U.S. Secretary of Commerce have approved the
LWRP.233 As a result, local, state and federal actions that
affect a New York City coastal area or inland waterway must
be reviewed by the New York City Department of City
Planning for consistency with the City’s LWRP.234 For actions
227. NYC LWRP, supra note 122; VISION 2020, supra note 126; Zoning Resolution
Text, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLAN’G. (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/
zone/zonetext.shtml [http://perma.cc/J9T3-X7QW].
228. The Underwater Lands Bill, Act of Aug. 7, ch. 791, § 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 4028,
4029 (codified as amended at N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 75 (McKinney 2014)).
229. See, e.g., New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 4 v. City of New York, No. D42904 (N.Y
App. Div. Nov. 19, 2014) (finding reasonable probability that city wetlands designation
is a regulatory taking under federal constitution).
230. The CZMA implements the national Coastal Zone Management Program,
which is administered federally by the Department of Commerce under the direction of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and at the state level by an
agency designated by each state or territory. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1455–1456-1456; see
generally PATRICIA SALKIN, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 9B:02 (4th ed.
2014).
231. See generally SALKIN, supra note 230, at § 9B:01. The intention of New York’s
Legislature in adopting the NYS CZMA was to provide “a balance between economic
development and preservation that will permit the beneficial use of coastal . . .
waterway resources while preventing the . . . diminution of open space areas or public
access to the waterfront, shoreline erosion, . . . or permanent adverse changes to
ecological systems.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 600.1(c).
232. 42 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 915 (McKinney 2014); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 19, § 601 (implementing optional LWRP provisions), available at http://www.
dos.ny.gov/opd/programs/pdfs/Article_42.pdf [http://perma.cc/3K95-J2RS].
233. NYC LWRP, supra note 122, at Cover Page 2.
234. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(c)(1)–(2) & (d) (“Federal agencies shall not approve proposed
projects that are inconsistent with the enforceable policies of a coastal state’s
management program, except upon a finding by the Secretary that such project is
consistent with the purposes of this chapter or necessary in the interest of national
security.”); 42 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 916 (McKinney 2014) (requiring “state agency program
actions be undertaken in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent
practicable with the approved [local] waterfront revitalization program,” including
reviews conducted under the state environmental quality review act”); 15 C.F.R. pt.
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directly or indirectly undertaken by state agencies, including
funding assistance and development projects,235 the state
agency with jurisdiction must complete an assessment in which
it determines whether the state action is consistent with the
NYC LWRP236 and file the assessment with the N.Y.
Department of State (“NY DOS”).237 When a project involves
federal action, such as federal funding or the issuance of a
federal permit, the project is subject to a federal consistency
review.238
In order to obtain a finding of consistency, a project must not
“substantially hinder the achievement of any of the policies [of
the LWRP] and, where practicable, [must] advance one or more
of the policies.”239 Only LWRP policies that are relevant to the
930 (2015) (implementing the federal consistency requirements of the CZMA); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 97.12(d)(13) (2015) (providing for state
environmental impact review based on effects of proposed action on applicable policies
of LWRP as opposed to WRP when municipality has an approved LWRP). See also
NYC LWRP, supra note 122, at 4 (“As a result of these approvals, state and federal
discretionary actions within the city’s coastal zone must be consistent to the maximum
extent practicable with the [L]WRP policies and the city must be given the opportunity
to comment on all state and federal projects within its coastal zone.”). See generally
SALKIN, supra note 230, at § 9B:10 (stating that, once approved, “LWRPs become
amendments to the state’s coastal management program, and ‘in effect, become the
policies and standards of the local government, the State of New York, and the federal
government.’”) (citing and quoting Stutchin v. Town of Huntington, 71 F. Supp. 2d 76,
89 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
235. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 600.3(a) (2015) (making state
funding contingent on compliance with article 42 of the Executive Law, which provides
requirements for NYS CZMA); 42 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 916(1)(a) (requiring NYS Secretary
of State to examine “programs which involve issuance of permits, licenses,
certifications and other forms of approval of land use or development, the provision of
grants, loans and other funding assistance which leads to or influences land use or
development, [and] directly undertaken land use or development and planning
activities” for consistency with approved LWRP).
236. See State Consistency, N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF PLAN’G & DEV., http://
www.dos.ny.gov/opd/programs/consistency/state.html [http://perma.cc/UT3D-WHNN]
(last visited May 20, 2015) (describing state consistency review process). A copy of the
N.Y. Department of State CAF is attached as Attachment B and is also available at
http://www.dos.ny.gov/opd/programs/pdfs/caf2.pdf [http://perma.cc/END3-7A2Q].
237. 42 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 916(1)(a) (McKinney 2014). See also State Consistency,
supra note 236 (describing state consistency review process).
238. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(c)(1)–(3) & (d) (2012); 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.30–46 (2015)
(including consistency for federal agency activities); id. at §§ 930.50–66 (including
consistency for activities requiring federal license or permit); id. at §§ 930.90–101
(including consistency for federal assistance to state or local governments); see also 42
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 912(9) (McKinney 2014) (declaring policy of assuring state and
federal consistency with approved LWRPs).
239. NYC LWRP, supra note 122, at 6.
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specific site, surroundings, or action are used to determine
consistency.240 Furthermore, the LWRP designates several
Special Natural Waterfront Areas (“SNWAs”) where additional
considerations must be given due to the “particular natural
habitat features” of those areas.241
The City’s current LWRP, which was approved by the City in
1999 and adopted by the state in 2002, focuses on increasing
public access to the waterfront and protection of habitat more
than flood mitigation, and does not consider sea level rise or
climate change at all. The LWRP includes a flood and erosion
hazard policy242 and, when a project is located within an
SNWA, the primary policy consideration for a consistency
determination is to “[p]rotect and restore the quality and
function of ecological systems,” which is subject to guidelines in
the TWA.243 An activity or project that “protect[s] or restore[s]”
special features in an SNWA is “consistent with waterfront
policy for these areas.”244 Additionally, the LWRP recognizes
that “enhancement of adjacent areas to provide natural
buffers” provides a viable method of protecting tidal
wetlands.245
Unlike the City’s current LWRP, the City’s comprehensive
coastal management plan Vision 2020 expressly recognizes a
policy of increasing climate resilience.246 Vision 2020, released
in 2011, provides the policies and goals that the City has set for
the revitalization of its waterfront area by the year 2020.247
The City Council approved revisions to its LWRP to incorporate

240. Id. at 7.
241. Id.
242. Similarly, the WRP provides that one policy of the State in regards to public
access is to “[p]rotect, maintain, and increase the levels and types of public access to
public water-related recreation resources and facilities so that these resources and
facilities may be fully utilized by all the public” with priority provided to public
beaches. Waterfront Revitalization of Coastal Areas and Inland Waterways, N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 600.5(g) (Mckinney 2012). The WRP also provides
that “[a]ccess to the public foreshore and to lands immediately adjacent to the
foreshore or water’s edge that are publicly owned shall be provided . . . . Such lands
shall be retained in public ownership.” Id. § 600.5(e)(2).
243. NYC LWRP, supra note 122 , at 16.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 18.
246. VISION 2020, supra note 126, at 104–13 (describing “Goal 8: Increase climate
resilience”).
247. Id. at 6.
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the goals in Vision 2020, including the climate resilience
goal.248 Notably, the revised LWRP will require consideration
in the planning and design of all new development projects of
“the potential vulnerabilities of the project to the effects of sea
level rise, coastal flooding, and storm surge over its usable life
and the general consequences to the project of these types of
events.”249
Given that waterfront projects that are undertaken by,
funded by, or approved by the city, state or federal government
must be consistent with the City’s LWRP, and local actions
must also be consistent with the City’s other applicable plans
including Vision 2020, one concrete action the City can take to
increase coastal resilience is to revisit its LWRP and Vision
2020 with an eye toward further strengthening the coastal
resilience policies in light of the risks of sea level rise, storm
surge and other weather extremes. For example, although the
City’s proposed amendments to its LWRP require consideration
of climate change and sea level rise in the planning process, the
revised LWRP encourages commercial and residential
development in “appropriate Coastal Zone areas.”250 The
revised LWRP lists eight criteria for determining what
constitutes an “appropriate” area for development—none of
which are climate change or sea level rise related risks.251
Thus, although the revised LWRP provides that “[p]rojects
should consider potential risks related to coastal flooding”252
and planning decisions should consider climate change and sea
level rise,253 the LWRP could further emphasize the goal of
coastal resilience by expressly recognizing the risks of
248. NYC REVISED LWRP, supra note 123, at 5–6.
249. Id. at 43.
250. NYC REVISED LWRP, supra note 123, at 16–17.
251. Id. at 16 (listing the following criteria: “compatibility with the continued
functioning of the designated Special Natural Waterfront Areas, the Arthur Kill
Ecologically Sensitive Maritime and Industrial Area, or Significant Maritime and
Industrial Areas, where applicable; the absence of unique or significant natural
features or, if present, the potential for compatible development; the presence of
substantial vacant or underused land; proximity to existing residential or commercial
uses; the potential for strengthening upland residential or commercial areas and for
opening up the waterfront to the public; transportation access; the maritime and
industrial jobs potentially displaced or created; and the new opportunities created by
redevelopment”).
252. Id. at 17.
253. Id. at 43–44.
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continued waterfront development and including climate
change and sea level related risks in the list of criteria for
determining if an area is appropriate for waterfront
development.
Currently, Vision 2020 recognizes sea level rise as an issue,
but also seeks to support economic development on the
waterfront and increase “water recreation, waterborne
transportation, and water-related cultural activities and
education programs,” with an emphasis on expanding public
access to the City’s waterfront and waterways.254 If the City
were to amend Vision 2020 or produce a supplemental coastal
management plan that clarified that coastal resilience is a
priority over other competing coastal policies, climate resilience
could potentially factor more heavily in local planning, zoning
and permitting decisions.
Another concrete action the City can take is to review the
SNWAs to determine if they need to be expanded to remain
consistent with sea level rise projections. Relatedly, the state
can support coastal communities’ resilience efforts by
reviewing and potentially amending the Tidal Wetlands Act to
provide for further protection of areas designated as SNWAs.
State and federal legislatures can also support municipal
coastal resilience efforts by reviewing and amending state and
federal coastal zone management programs to place greater
emphasis on reducing risks related to climate change.
In the meantime, the City can stop approving the
development of critical facilities like daycare centers and
hospitals in areas currently prone to flooding or likely to be
prone to flooding within the lifetime of the facility. It can also
increase its review of commercial and residential developments
in vulnerable areas to require the projects to have a net
reduction in the flood resilience of the area, rather than
requiring only that the project be neutral in terms of flood
impact. Of course, implementation of these measures would
have both political and economic costs including, among other
things, takings challenges. The goals of these measures could
be achieved, potentially, through market mechanisms not
subject to takings challenges if readily available information
accurately identified current and future flood risk in the City’s
254. VISION 2020, supra note 126, at 7.
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most vulnerable areas. For example, the City’s Green Building
Task Force proposed that the City amend its current flood map,
which is based on historical data and does not account for
future sea level rise, to “reflect projected sea-level rise and
increases in coastal flooding through the year 2080,” and
update this map at least once every ten years.255 With readily
available long-term flood projections, persons desiring to build
in the most vulnerable areas may themselves opt to choose a
different location or may find it difficult to secure necessary
funding or insurance.256
C. 80 by 50: Impressive but Probably Insufficient to Stay
Within a 2°C Pathway
The City’s September 2014 announcement of its “80 by 50”
initiative distinguishes the City as a role model city with
respect to local GHG emissions reduction commitments,
consistent with the City’s boast that the revised commitment
makes New York “the largest city in the world to commit to
this goal.”257 However, to avoid dangerous interference with
our climate system, New York City and municipalities looking
to the City’s initiative as a possible model should consider
whether they can commit to larger, more accelerated
reductions.
1. Is the City’s Target Sufficient to Avoid Dangerous
Interference with the Climate System?
AR5 warns that to have a better than two-in-three chance of
avoiding the dangerous interference with our climate system
that would occur with a 2°C increase in average global
temperatures over pre-industrial levels,258 global GHG
255. NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at BR1-1 to BR 1-3. As of
April 2015, this proposal had not yet been implemented.
256. See Nolon, supra note 2, at 337, 343 (discussing market mechanisms for
shifting patterns of development out of disaster prone areas).
257. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 3. Note, however, that numerous
other cities in the United States and abroad have committed to achieving larger
reductions. See infra notes 299–301 & accompanying text.
258. The 2009 Copenhagen Accord “recognize[d] the scientific view that the increase
in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius,” or 3.6°F, to prevent
dangerous interference with the climate system, prevention of which was the goal of
the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (“UNCCC”). Note that many small
island nations called for a goal of 1.5°C because 2°C is projected to result in sea level

480

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 40:3

emissions must be reduced by at least 40–70% below 1990
levels by 2050, and to zero or below by 2100.259 Others warn
that, to avoid the 2°C threshold, we must decrease humancaused GHG emissions to zero by 2050,260 and still others warn
that the carbon emissions budget will be exhausted by between
2024 and 2039.261
The City makes three claims with respect to its role in
reducing emissions sufficient to avoid the “most dangerous
impacts of climate change.”262 First, the City claims that its
commitment is “in line with the UN target,” which the City
characterizes as a 50% reduction below 1990 levels by 2050.
Second, the City suggests that its commitment is larger than
this UN target and in line with a higher UN target for
rise that would submerge some of these nations. See generally Climate Change: The
‘Greatest Threat’ to the Peoples of the Pacific, ISLAND BUS. (July 31, 2014), http://
www.islandsbusiness.com/news/palau/5906/climate-change-the-greatest-threat-to-thepeoples-/ [http://perma.cc/TF5U-PUTL].
259. See John C. Dernbach, Achieving Dramatic Reductions in GHG Emissions
Through Sustainable Development, in Sarah J. Adams-Schoen et al., supra note 5, at
10029–31. In his article, John Dembach cites and parses apart the following
paragraph from IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 27 (2013)
(footnotes omitted), available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/
WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/L7KM-TCWH] [hereinafter WGI SPM]:
Limiting the warming caused by anthropogenic CO2 emissions alone with a
probability of >33%, >50%, and >66% to less than 2°C since the period 1861–1880,
will require cumulative CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic sources to stay
between 0 and about 1570 GtC (5760 GtCO2), 0 and about 1210 GtC (4440 GtCO2),
and 0 and about 1000 GtC (3670 GtCO2) since that period, respectively. These
upper amounts are reduced to about 900 GtC (3300 GtCO2), 820 GtC (3010 GtCO2),
and 790 GtC (2900 GtCO2), respectively, when accounting for non-CO2 forcings as
in RCP2.6. An amount of 515 [445 to 585] GtC (1890 [1630 to 2150] GtCO2) was
already emitted by 2011.
Id.
260. See, e.g., B Team Open Letter Calls for Bold Climate Action at COP21 in Paris,
B TEAM (Feb. 5, 2015), http://bteam.org/the-b-team/b-team-open-letter-calls-for-boldclimate-action-at-cop21-in-paris/ [http://perma.cc/BF5N-PFGZ ]; see also V.
Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference with the
Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14245,
14245 (2008) (estimating global warming of 2.4°C even if GHG concentrations held to
2005 levels).
261. Dernbach, supra note 259, at 10030 n.16 (citing Malte Meinshausen et al.,
Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global Warming to 2°C, 458 NATURE
1158, 1159 (2009), in stating that based on past and projected emissions, “we would
exhaust the CO2 emission budget by 2024, 2027 or 2039, depending on the probability
accepted for exceeding 2°C (respectively 20%, 25% or 50%)”).
262. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 5.
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developed nations. Third, the City suggests that it has set this
higher target to account for the City’s historically
disproportionately high contributions of GHG emissions and
higher per capita emissions:
In line with the UN target, we will put New York City on a
pathway to achieve an 80 percent reduction in GHG emissions
from 2005 levels by 2050.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”) projects that by 2050, global GHG
emissions must be reduced by 50% below 1990 levels to avoid the
most dangerous impacts of climate change. Developed countries
must reduce their emissions even more aggressively—by up to
80% by 2050—to account for their greater contribution to global
emissions to date and their higher than average per-capita
emissions. If we fail, the impacts of climate change will be farreaching and felt by all, but with the worst consequences for the
world’s
poorest
and
most
vulnerable
populations.263

Although the City’s emissions reduction commitment of 80%
below 2005 levels by 2050 is amongst the highest municipal
GHG emissions reductions commitments, the City’s three
claims nevertheless warrant scrutiny. First, the City’s claim
that its commitment is “in line with the UN target” of 50% by
2050 is accurate if the UNFCC’s Bali Action Plan’s so-called
“50 by 50” proposal is interpreted as a “UN target.”264 The
2007 Bali Action Plan called for a long-term objective that
included reduction of global emissions 50% below 1990 levels
by 2050, and this proposal was endorsed by the Group of Eight
Industrialized nations.265 But, to clarify, a 50 by 50 target is
not present in any binding or nonbinding international
agreement. Additionally, it should be noted that the 50 by
2050 objective was likely based on AR4 projections,266 and AR5
263. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 5–6; see also United Nations
General Assembly, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771
UNTS 107; S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM
849 (1992) [hereinafter “UNFCCC”].
264. Conference of the Parties, Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, UN Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008).
265. See Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference:
A
Postmortem, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 230, 235 (2010).
266. THIRD WORLD NETWORK (TWN), SHARED VISION AND BURDEN SHARING IN THE
“GLOBAL GOAL” 2 (2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/smsn/ngo/
064.pdf [http://perma.cc/6M6N-EADH] (suggesting the 50 by 50 target comes from
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revised the target upwards to between 40 and 70 by 2050.267
Also, the City’s target and the Bali Action Plan proposal are
based on different baselines. Nevertheless, even taking into
consideration the differences in baseline, the City’s
commitment to reduce its emissions 80% below 2005 levels by
2050 is in line with both the Bali Action Plan proposal of 50 by
50 and the AR5 global targets of 40–70% below 1990 levels by
2050.268
However, the City’s claim that its target is consistent with
the UN’s 80 by 50 target for developed countries269 is
potentially misleading. Unlike the City’s 80 by 50 target,
which refers to reductions below 2005 levels, the UN’s call for
80% reductions by 2050 for developed countries refers to
reductions below 1990 levels.270 Using global emissions data
from 1990 and 2005, the UN’s 80 by 50 target equates to a
reduction from 35.0 GtCO2e to 7.0 GtCO2e; whereas, the City’s
target equates to a reduction from 43.16 GtCO2e to 8.63
GtCO2e271 (based on global data), a difference of 1.6 gigatonnes
of CO2 equivalent. The City’s target would have to be
increased to 83.78% to achieve the larger UN goal for developed
countries.272 To assess the true significance of the difference in
baseline, the City’s goal should be adjusted to reflect the
difference between New York City’s 1990 and 2005 GHG
footnote 1 linked to the fourth paragraph of the Bali Action Plan chapeau, which refers
to figures in AR4, Working Group III).
267. See Dernbach, supra note 259, at 10030; AR5 WGI SPM, supra note 258, at 27.
268. The City uses a 2005 baseline and the Bali Action Plan and AR5 use a 1990
baseline. Based on global emissions data, 80% below 2005 emissions (43.16 GtCO2e *
0.2 = 8.63 GtCO2e) is a larger reduction than 70% below 1990 emissions (35.0 GtCO2e
* 0.3 = 10.5 GtCO2e). See also infra notes 271–72 & accompanying text (citing source
of data and further comparing goals based on different baselines).
269. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16 (recognizing UN call for “[d]eveloped
countries [to] reduce their emissions even more aggressively—by up to 80% by 2050—
to account for their greater contribution to global emissions to date and their higher
than average per-capita emissions.”). “Developed countries” refers to “Annex I”
countries of the Kyoto Protocol.
270. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 5–6.
271. This back-of-the-envelope conversion is based on global emissions of 35.0
GtCO2e in 1990 and 43.16 GtCO2e in 2005, an increase of 23.33%. See Climate Action
Tracker, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, http://climateactiontracker.org [http://perma.cc/
7GRM-8JX7] (last visited June 26, 2015).
272. Eighty percent below 1990 levels (35.0 GtCO2e) and 83.78% below 2005 levels
(43.16 GtCO2e) is 7.0 GtCO2e (the UN target). 80% below 2005 levels (43.16 GtCO2e)
and 75% below 1990 levels (35.0 GtCO2e) is 8.63 GtCO2e (the City target based on
global data).
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emissions; however, 1990 emissions levels for the City are not
available.273
Finally, the City’s suggestion that it has set a higher target
than the so-called UN 50 by 50 target to account for the City’s
historically disproportionately high contributions of GHG
emissions and higher per capita emissions may accurately
describe the City’s intention in setting its 80 by 50 goal, but
may nonetheless give readers a false sense that the “most
dangerous impacts of climate change”274 will be avoided as long
as developed countries and their cities “reduce their
emissions . . . aggressively—by up to 80 percent by
2050 . . . .”275 The projections underlying the UN call for
developed countries to reduce emissions by 80% assume that
countries will meet their commitments, an assumption that has
not borne out in practice.
Specifically, assuming developed country emissions are
reduced by 80% (from 1990 levels) and other countries meet
their reduction pledges, the global average reduction is
projected to be sufficient to limit average global emissions to 21
gigatonnes by 2050, an amount projected to keep us within the
2°C pathway.276 However, a significant gap exists between
GHG emissions reductions pledges and the 21 gigatonnes by
2050 ceiling.277 The International Energy Agency (“IEA”)
projects that—even assuming full implementation of existing
government measures to curb CO2 emissions and cautious
implementation of policies in the pipeline—GHG emissions will
rise 20% by 2040, “putting the world on track for a long-term
global temperature increase of 3.6°C.”278 And others project
273. URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, 90 BY 50: NYC CAN REDUCE ITS CARBON FOOTPRINT
90% BY 2050 14 (2013), available at http://urbangreencouncil.org/sites/default/
files/90_by_50_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/49N7-NVRE] (reporting that accurate GHG
emissions data for the city date back only to 2005).
274. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 5.
275. Id. See also UNFCCC, supra note 263.
276. The UNEP issued a progress report in 2012 on global emissions, which
concluded that, among other things, to stay within the 2°C pathway, average global
GHG emissions need to be limited to 21 gigatonnes by 2050. UN ENV’T PROGRAMME,
THE EMISSION GAP REPORT 2012: A UNEP SYNTHESIS REPORT 3 (2012).
277. See id. at 1 (projecting that filed pledges pursuant to the Copenhagen Accord
would result in a gap by 2020 of 14 gigatonnes between global emissions and the level
needed to stay below 2°C).
278. See IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 FACT SHEET 1–2 (2014), available at
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2014/141112_WEO_FactSheets.
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even bleaker scenarios.279 At the 2013 Conference of Parties
(“COP19”) in Warsaw, recognizing this “ambition gap,” the
parties agreed that global GHG emissions need to peak this
decade, and get to zero net emissions by the second half of this
century. Similarly, both the UNEP and IEA have been urging
since 2010 that to have a reasonable chance of staying within
the 2°C pathway, countries must make vigorous efforts to cut
their GHG emissions by the year 2020, with even stronger
action thereafter.280 Climate Tracker projects that, to stay
within a 2°C pathway, developed country reductions need to be
within the range of 25–40% below 1990 levels by 2020, based
on projections from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
(“AR4”).281 For New York City’s 2005-baseline target to be
roughly consistent with this 2020 goal (which should be
increased to account for the more up-to-date projections in
AR5), the City’s reductions must be in the range of 39–51%
below 2005 levels by 2020.282
To further illustrate the gap, Scenarios A and B in the table
below show two paths toward a global 50 by 50 target.283 In
pdf [http://perma.cc/D3XL-BRZY]. This projection is based on IEA’s “New Policies
Scenario,” which “takes into account policies and implementing measures affecting
energy markets that had been adopted as of mid-2014, together with relevant policy
proposals, even if specific measures needed to put them into effect have yet to be fully
developed. It assumes only cautious implementation of such commitments and plans.”
IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 687 (2014), available at http://www.
worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/energymodel/policydatabase/WEO2014_Ann
exB.pdf [http://perma.cc/RM5N-GBH4].
279. See, e.g., Ramanathan & Feng, supra note 260, at 14245 (estimating global
warming of 2.4°C even if GHG concentrations held to 2005 levels).
280. See IEA, Executive Summary, in WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010 45 (2010);
UNEP, Technical Summary, in THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT: ARE THE COPENHAGEN
ACCORD PLEDGES SUFFICIENT TO LIMIT GLOBAL WARMING TO 2°C OR 1.5°C? A
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 10 (advance copy) (November 2010). UNEP suggested that
to have a likely chance of avoiding exceeding the 2°C threshold, global emissions must
peak before 2020, with substantial declines in emissions thereafter. “Likely” refers to a
greater than 66% probability. Id. at 14.
281. See Climate Action Tracker, supra note 271.
282. As with the above conversions, this conversion is based on global GHG
emissions data, and not New York City data, for 1990 and 2005.
283. The data in the table and this analysis is illustrative only. It is based on a
compilation of sources that likely do not include the same assumptions. The 1990 data
for “developed” countries is from an excel spreadsheet derived from the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY OF GHG EMISSIONS FOR ANNEX I 1
(2012), available at https://unfccc.int/files/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/
application/pdf/ai_ghg_profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8Q2-ARE3].
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Scenario A, developed countries achieve an 80% reduction of
their GHG emissions from 1990 levels and in Scenario B
developed countries achieve a 100% reduction from 1990 levels.
As Scenario A shows, if developed countries reduce their
emissions 80% (i.e., from 19 to 3.8 gigatonnes of CO2
equivalent), developing countries would have to decrease their
emissions 33% (i.e., from 20.4 to 13.7 gigatonnes of CO2
equivalent) in order to achieve a global emissions reduction of
50% (i.e., from 35 to 17.5 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent). While
a 33% reduction may sound attainable, at least as compared to
80%, note that developing countries would have to achieve this
reduction in emissions at the same time as their populations
are expected to double,284 which means that Scenario A would
require developing countries to decrease their emissions from
5.0 tonnes per capita to 1.7 tonnes per capita—a 66% reduction
in per capita emissions. Moreover, they would have to reduce
per capita emissions by 66% while at the same time attempting
to increase GNP.285 Scenario B also depicts a path toward a
global 50 by 50 target, with developed countries achieving
100% reductions in their emissions. In this scenario, to get the
rest of the way toward a 50% reduction in global emissions,
developing countries would have to reduce emissions to 14%
below the 1990 baseline. Given expected population growth, a
14% decrease in developing country emissions represents a
56% reduction in per capita emissions.
Year/
Scenario

Total GHG
emissions
(gigatonnes
of CO2
equivalent)

Developed
country
emissions

Developing
country
emissions

Pop. of
developing
countries
(billions)

Developing
country
emissions
per capita

284. The population of developing countries’ is expected to double between 1990 and
2050 (from 4.1 billion to 8 billion), while the population of developed countries is
expected to remain relatively flat. Press Release, UN Population Division, World
Population to Exceed 9 Billion by 2050 (Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://
www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/pressrelease.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
GF4A-W9UJ].
285. Developing countries are projected to have continued GNP growth of 6% per
year (or 4% GNP growth per capita). U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS & U.N. CONF.
ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 2013 6 (2013),
available at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_archive/2013
wesp.pdf [http://perma.cc/H7EL-P4CH].
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1990

35

19

20.4

4

5.0

2050:

17.5

3.8

13.7

8

1.7

Scenario
A

(50%)

(80%)

(33%)

2050:

17.5

0

17.5

Scenario
B

(50%)

(100%)

(14%)

(66%)
8

2.2
(56%)

As a normative question, how much of the onus of staying
within a 2°C pathway should be placed on developing versus
developed countries is hotly debated. But, as a positive
question, the crux of the issue is whether in combination
developed and developing countries can achieve the reductions
necessary to stay within a 2°C pathway, and, if so, how that
can be done. The proposition that developing countries will
achieve per capita reductions of between 52 and 61% appears
untenable.
Although developing countries have fewer
infrastructure locked-in problems,286 in light of doubling
populations, steady GNP growth, and substantially fewer
resources,287 it is difficult to fathom how developing countries
could achieve even a 52% per capita cut in emissions.
2. Can the City Achieve Deeper Reductions?
Of course, cities—even cities of the scale of New York City—
cannot control all or even most of the factors that contribute to
local GHG emissions.288
According to the U.S. Energy
Information Agency (“EIA”), the factors that contribute to
statewide per-capita GHG emissions include climate, the
structure of the state economy, population density, energy
sources, building standards, and explicit state policies to
reduce emissions.289 Although cities tend to have control over

286. See supra note 284 (discussing opportunities in developing countries).
287. WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 2013, supra note 285, at 67.
288. See supra Part I.A. (discussing municipality’s ability to influence factors that
contribute to GHG emissions).
289. See generally EIA, EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES
2008 (2009), available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/0573(2008).pdf [http://
perma.cc/7QZV-KSDW].
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building efficiencies and density,290 most existing cities have
little control over the remaining factors.291 Cities have little or
no control over their baseline climate or whether the city or
state economy is largely driven by energy production or nonenergy-production activities.292 Further, state public utility
commissions and legislatures typically shape energy use in a
state. Increasingly, however, cities are exerting influence or
control over the energy sources they use for heating and
electricity.293
Indeed, more than 80% of New York City’s GHG emissions
reductions to-date are attributable to the City’s shift from coal
and oil energy sources to natural gas and, to a small extent,
renewable resources, and other improvements to utility
operations.294 The City characterizes these reductions as the
low-hanging fruit, observing that improvement in utility
operations strategies “cannot be replicated, and future
reductions will be much more difficult to achieve.”295
PlaNYC’s planners and advisory board set the City’s target
so that it would be both aggressive and achievable, on the
290. See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing New York City’s building efficiency
initiatives).
291. IPCC, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION
OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Edenhofer, O. et al.
eds., 2014).
292. See Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and Cities, in Adams-Schoen et al.,
supra note 5, at 10037 (discussing factors, noting that energy-producing economies are
tied to the physical location of energy resources, and identifying Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as an example of a city that has shifted its economy to non-energy
production activities).
293. See id. at 10038 (discussing Chicago, Illinois’ “electric aggregation” program
whereby the city decreased its reliance on coal and increased its use of renewable
resources by entering into long-term power purchase agreements (“PPAs”) with
electricity suppliers on behalf of its citizens). See also Herman K. Trabish, A Utility in
the Making: The Municipalization of Boulder, Colorado, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 27, 2014),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/a-utility-in-the-making-the-municipalization-ofboulder-colorado/300268/ [http://perma.cc/UUD9-3XPM] (discussing municipalization of
electric utilities); Mahesh Bhave, Microgrids Create Municipalization Benefits,
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (June 2, 2014), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/
rea/news/article/2014/06/microgrids-create-municipalization-benefits [http://perma.cc/
Y7FQ-9ZXU] (discussing local efforts around distributed generation).
294. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 7. Changes in utility operations
included: decreased wastewater treatment plan methane, improved landfill methane
capture, less carbon intensive electricity generation, more efficient steam generation,
and a reduction in fugitive SF6 emissions. Id.
295. Id. at 6.
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theory that an overly ambitious or unrealistic target would not
be implemented.296 At least in PlaNYC’s initial stages, the
Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability (“OLTPS”)
took a more conservative approach in its modeling and based
efficiency estimates on current technologies, rather than on
future technological improvements.297 In initially developing
PlaNYC’s emissions reduction target, OLTPS researched best
practice plans and programs, including Portland, Oregon’s
climate action plan, Santa Monica’s sustainability plan,
London’s Better Buildings Partnership Program, and
congestion pricing programs in London and Stockholm.298
These cities and others may provide models for New York
City to increase and accelerate its GHG emissions reduction
commitment. By way of comparison, London, England has set
CO2 emissions reduction targets of 20% by 2015, 40% by 2020,
60% by 2025 and 80% by 2030 (from 1990 levels);299 the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government’s target is 25% by 2020 (from 2000
levels)300; and, the City of Chicago’s target is 25% by 2020 (from
1990 levels).301 The Urban Green Council, the New York
Chapter of the U.S. Green Building Council, has also identified
strategies for the City to achieve more aggressive emissions
reduction, ultimately concluding that the City can achieve a
90% reduction from its 2010 GHG emissions levels by 2050.302

296.
297.
298.
299.

ICLEI PLANYC CASE STUDY, supra note 30, at 20.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Mayor of London, Executive Summary, in DELIVERING LONDON’S ENERGY
FUTURE: THE MAYOR’S CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND ENERGY STRATEGY viii–ix
(2011), available at http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Energy-future-oct11exec-summ.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZC44-VSTN]. In 2007, Parliament enacted the Greater
London Authority Act 2007, which imposes a duty on the London mayor to address
climate change as it relates to Greater London, including strategies for minimizing
GHG emissions and increasing efficient production and use of energy. Greater London
Authority Act 2007, 2007, c. 24, §§ 42–44 (Eng.), available at http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/24/pdfs/ukpga_20070024_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/9KAEY6Q3].
300. Carbonn Climate Report: Tokyo Metropolitan Government, CARBONN CLIMATE
REGISTRY,
http://carbonn.org/data/report/commitments/?tx_datareport_pi1[uid]=102
[http://perma.cc/5EWQ-9YLC] (last visited June 13, 2015).
301. Carbonn Climate Report: City of Chicago, CARBONN CLIMATE REGISTRY,
http://carbonn.org/data/report/commitments/?tx_datareport_pi1[uid]=327 [http://perma.
cc/R7QG-XAHH] (last visited June 13, 2015).
302. URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, supra note 273, at 1.
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However, without additional supportive state and federal
policies, municipalities like New York City remain constrained
in their ability to achieve maximum GHG emissions
reductions. For example, preemption and other hurdles beyond
the City’s control limit the extent to which the City can impose
performance standards on motor vehicles.303 The result is that
although NYC’s 80 by 50 initiative probably makes an
insufficient contribution to the global effort to remain within a
2°C pathway, the target may be close to the City’s maximum
achievable target.304 Nevertheless the targets of other cities
like London suggest that New York City should reevaluate
whether it can achieve an even higher target, including an
aggressive 2020 target.
D. Setting the Standard for Local Data Collection, Analysis and
Benchmarking
New York City’s local data collection, analysis and
benchmarking initiatives provide a model of municipal data
analysis and transparency. Resiliency, sustainability and
energy efficiency data benchmarking like the City’s provides
relatively easy access to information that has the potential to
encourage market transactions that favor sustainable market
participants; shape energy-efficient and other sustainable and
resilient behaviors; and provide an empirical foundation upon
which to assess current initiatives and guide future policies.305
When the Mayor’s Office convened NPCC1 in 2008, New
York City became the first city to scale down the United
Nation’s IPCC global climate models to develop climate-related

303. See infra Part III.F (discussing state and federal law and policy obstacles to
municipal mitigation); but see Climate Smart Communities Summary for Local
Officials, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVT’L CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/
energy/50851.html [http://perma.cc/P6BT-WK8F] (last visited May 21, 2015) (providing
resources for local communities to decrease GHG emissions).
304. But see URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, supra note 273, at 1 (asserting that the City
can achieve a 90% reduction from 2010 GHG emissions levels by 2050).
305. See, e,g., Klass, supra note 292, at 10038 (discussing energy efficiency
benchmarking and noting that Austin, Texas; Seattle, Washington; Washington, D.C.;
and Minneapolis, Minnesota “impose some form of benchmarking requirements on
commercial buildings and mandate some information disclosure to local governments
or prospective buyers to increase demand for energy efficient buildings”).
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projections specific to a municipality.306 The City’s subsequent
codification of Local Law 42—which established NPCC as an
ongoing body with regular data analysis and reporting
requirements, and established a New York City climate change
adaptation task force, also with regular reporting
requirements307—and Local Law 84—which requires regular
reporting on energy and water use of public and private
properties308—distinguishes the City as ahead of the curve with
respect to local-scale climate data analysis, risk assessment,
and benchmarking.
With respect to the City’s emissions reductions and other
building sustainability plans, building owners are mandated by
law to annually record energy and water use, and this
information is publicly disclosed by the City.309 With the
release of the City’s Local Law 84 benchmarking report in
2013, the City became the first U.S. city to analyze and publicly
disclose energy and water use data for multiple years for more
than 8,000 private sector properties.310 With respect to the 80
by 50 initiative, the City also updates its GHG emissions
inventory annually and reports on the progress of its climate
change mitigation initiatives in annual reports that are
publically available on the City’s website.311
In addition to accountability mechanisms specific to the
green building and 80 by 50 initiatives, OLTPS also uses
multiple approaches for monitoring and reporting progress on
the City’s other sustainability initiatives. OLTPS produces
annual PlaNYC progress reports, which provide detailed
306. IPCC, the international advisory body on climate change, was formed in 1988
by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment
Programme. See NPCC2, supra note 94.
307. 2012 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 42 (codified at N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-122–3123). See also supra notes 144–47 & accompanying text (discussing NPCC and task
force requirements).
308. 2005 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 86 § 2, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dob/
downloads/pdf/ll_86of2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/RM7Y-U5U3].
309. See id.; BENCHMARKING REPORT 2014, supra note 27, at 8.
310. PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24, at 19.
311. See PlaNYC, Ongoing Resiliency Projects, MAYOR’S OFFICE OF RECOVERY &
RESILIENCY,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/progress/progress.shtml
[http://
perma.cc/MS4H-TG63] (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (providing links to progress and
benchmarking reports); see also, e.g., CITY OF NEW YORK, INVENTORY OF NEW YORK
CITY GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2014), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
planyc/downloads/pdf/NYC_GHG_Inventory_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/4ME7-486E].
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updates on the implementation progress of the 127 PlaNYC
Following the City’s publication of its
initiatives.312
comprehensive analysis of vulnerabilities post-Sandy, Stronger,
More Resilient, the annual PlaNYC progress report also
includes updates on the resiliency initiatives proposed in
Stronger, More Resilient.313 These reporting requirements are
codified in local law, which, among other things requires the
City to report on a set of sustainability indicators to measure
the progress towards achieving the goals in PlaNYC.314 The
City’s sustainability indicators were released on Earth Day
2009 and have since been incorporated into the City’s Citywide
Performance Report, which the City updates on a monthly
basis and which is available online.315
The City is also involved in a number of data initiatives at
the national and international scale. For example, the City
contributed data to the Building Performance Database, a
data-sharing platform in partnership with the U.S.
Department of Energy (“DOE”).316 The City has also joined the
Urban Sustainability Directors Network, an international
community of municipalities that are engaging in
benchmarking and exchanging best practices and lessonslearned.317 OLTPS also participated as a Steering Committee
member in the development of the STAR Community Index, a
national sustainability framework for local governments.318

312. See, e.g., PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24, at 34–54.
313. See, e.g., id. at 91–106.
314. 2008 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 17.
315. See ICLEI PLANYC CASE STUDY, supra note 30, at 45 (describing City’s
mechanisms for reporting on implementation of its sustainability plan).
316. PROGRESS REPORT 2014, supra note 24, at 33.
317. Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance Press Release—March 2015, URB.
SUSTAINABILITY DIRECTORS NETWORK (Mar. 27, 2015), http://usdn.org/public/
CNCAMarch2015PressRelease.html [http://perma.cc/XE7V-MUCS].
318. See generally STAR Sustainability Goals and Guiding Principles, ICLEI,
http://www.icleiusa.org/sustainability/star-community-index/star-goals-and-guidingprinciples [http://perma.cc/M34Q-3W5A] (last visited May 21, 2015) (STAR’s “81
sustainability goals and 10 guiding principles collectively define community-scale
sustainability, and present a vision of how communities can become more healthy,
inclusive, and prosperous across eight specific categories”).
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E. Green Building Codes and Benchmarking for a Resilient
Future
In 2013, the City studied opportunities to achieve an 80 by 50
reduction based on current technologies. The study found that
nearly two-thirds of the GHG reductions that are needed must
come from more efficient buildings.319 The City has already
achieved a 19% reduction of its GHG emissions from 2005
levels, and One City, Built to Last identifies a strategy for
achieving an additional 61% reduction in GHG emissions by
2050.320 To stay on track with this, the plan states that the
City must achieve an overall reduction in the energy used to
heat, cool, and power buildings of 30% below 2005 levels by
2025.321
One question the City’s approach begs is whether the NYC
Green Codes Task Force’s 111 code amendment proposals are
sufficient to achieve the deepest possible cuts in GHG
emissions.322 As of April 2015, 52 of the 111 proposals had
been implemented and another 4 had been partially
These proposals are comprehensive and
implemented.323
proactive, putting New York City at the forefront of
municipalities using building code reform as a means of climate
change adaptation and mitigation. However, a review of model
codes, USGBC recommendations, and initiatives of other major
cities such as London suggests that, while New York City’s
approach puts it ahead of many municipalities, the City should
continue to examine whether it is responding appropriately to
the urgency and scope of the climate change problem. And,
319. ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 7 (noting that nearly threequarters of the city’s GHG emissions come not from vehicles, but rather from the city’s
more than one million buildings).
320. See ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 7–15.
321. Id. This target is based on a reduction in the GHG from buildings specifically,
which emitted 60% of total citywide 2005 GHG emissions. Id. at 11. The City states
that a 30% reduction in these emissions will generate $8.5 billion in total cost savings
for New Yorkers. Id. But see supra Part III.C (discussing need to increase emissions
reduction goal); URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, supra note 273, at 1 (concluding that 80 by 50
goal is “noble,” but “not enough” and that the City can achieve an even greater
reduction).
322. But see URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, supra note 273, at 17–26 (analyzing numerous
strategies for decreasing carbon footprint of City’s building sector).
323. See NYC Green Codes Proposal Tracker, supra note 157 (providing status of all
111 proposals and links to applicable legislation, local laws, and the proposal).
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indeed, the NYC Green Codes Task Force proposals call for
continued examination of how the codes can be most effectively
amended to mitigate and adapt to climate change.324
Of the 111 proposals included in the Task Force Report, nine
proposals specifically targeted building resiliency:
BR1: Develop flood maps that reflect projected sea-level rise and
increases in coastal flooding through the year 2080. Currently,
flood maps are based on historical data and do not account for
projected climate change-related sea-level rise. This proposal
would create a New York City Climate Change Flood Map, which
would be updated at least once every ten years.325
BR2: Require toxic materials stored in the 100-year floodplain to
be located in flood-proof areas.326
BR3: Require a multi-agency study of building codes, zoning
resolutions and urban design in relation to the 100-year flood
map projected out to 2080. Building code revisions to be
considered would include: (a) foundation requirements that take
into account the effect of rising sea levels on structures and
buildings due to buoyancy and water infiltration; (b) freeboard,
frame and wash-away structures at first floors; (c) areas of refuge
in the event of a citywide power outage; (d) hurricane-resistant
buildings; and (e) mold-resistant construction. Zoning revisions
to be considered would include: (a) raising “measuring points”
within the flood zone; (b) specifying zoning uses to be included
within flood zones; and (c) requirements for shelter areas and
areas of refuge. The study would also include urban design
aspects.327
BR4: Require the City to undertake a study to determine
whether building code and zoning changes are necessary to
diminish the impacts of non-flood climatic hazards.328
BR5: Require the City to undertake a study examining the
climate risks posed to buildings through 2080. This study would
determine whether impacts will vary across the city or have a
324. See, e.g., NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at BR3-1
(recommending that City undertake study to determine how building codes and zoning
resolutions should be strengthened to protect buildings from sea-level rise and
flooding).
325. Id. at BR1-1 to BR1-3.
326. Id. at BR2-1 to BR2-3.
327. Id. at BR3-1 to BR3-2.
328. Id. at BR4-1.
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uniform impact, and then define and map hazard zones in the
city based on these risks. This study would analyze risks from
the following hazards: rainfall quantity, frequency, intensity and
seasonal modifications; heat waves; increased humidity;
increased temperatures; probability of other extreme weather
events; rise in groundwater table; encroachment of salinity;
increased wind velocities; electrical grid disruptions caused by
extreme weather events; interaction of increased temperatures
with the urban heat island effect; and impact of increased
temperature, changes in precipitation and humidity on air
quality.329
BR6: Require the City to undertake a study of passive
survivability330 and dual-mode functionality331 and propose code
changes to incorporate these concepts into the City’s building
codes. This proposal also includes a study on refuge areas in
sealed buildings.332
BR7: Amend the New York City Plumbing Code to require that
toilets and faucets are capable of operating without building
power for at least two weeks.333
BR8: Amend the New York City Plumbing Code to prohibit the
removal of existing water towers and require water towers in all
new and renovated buildings.334
BR9: Endorse the NYC Mayor’s Office of Environmental
Coordination’s effort to provide guidance for analyzing climate
change in environmental assessment conducted pursuant to the
City Environmental Quality Review (“CEQR”). CEQR is the
process by which agencies review the effects of proposed actions
on the environment. Under the Mayor’s proposal, as endorsed by
329. Id. at BR5-1.
330. Task Force member Alex Wilson formulated the concept of “passive
survivability,” which is the idea that buildings should be designed and built so that
they can remain habitable in the absence of an outside power supply. Proposal BR6
notes that, “[i]n the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 30,000 residents of New Orleans
sought refuge in the Superdome for several days. This rapidly turned into a nightmare
because without electricity and air conditioning, temperatures within the building
became almost unendurably hot. In contrast, the people who stayed in the French
Quarter were relatively comfortable. This is because the older buildings in the Quarter
were designed for some degree of passive cooling since they were built before air
conditioning was available.” Id. at BR6-2.
331. “Dual mode functionality” refers to reducing the emergency energy needs of the
building by designing it to function in two modes—a “standard mode” and a “low
energy” mode. Id. at BR6-1.
332. Id.
333. Id. at BR7-1.
334. Id. at BR8-1.
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the Task Force, the CEQR guidelines would be updated to
include an assessment of the impact of climate change on
proposed actions.335

As of April 2015, six of the nine building resiliency proposals
have been implemented: BR 2 (Safeguard Toxic Materials
Stored in Flood Zones),336 BR 3 (Study Adaptive Strategies to
Flooding),337 BR 4 (Study Adaptive Strategies to Non-Flood
Climatic Risks),338 BR 5 (Forecast Non-Flood Climatic Hazards
to 2080),339 BR 6 (Analyze Strategies to Maintain Habitability
During Power Outages),340 and BR 7 (Ensure Toilets and Sinks
Can Operate During Blackouts).341 BR 1, BR 8 and BR 9 have
not yet been implemented.
In evaluating the Task Force’s proposals, one potentially
useful point of comparison is the International Green
Construction Code (“IgCC”). USGBC recommends that states
and local jurisdictions adopt the International Code Council’s
(“ICC’s”) IgCC.342 The IgCC was developed to provide a model
sustainability code for the entire construction project and its
site; the code establishes minimum green requirements that
promote sustainability and energy efficiency.343 Although the
335. Id. at BR9-1.
336. See GCTF Enacted Proposals, MAYOR’S OFFICE OF RECOVERY & RESILIENCY,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/html/codes/enacted.shtml [http://perma.cc/7F8D-R8SH]
(last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (citing NYCBC, app. G and 2013 N.Y.C. Local Law 143).
337. See id. (citing Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency and Building
Resiliency Task Force).
338. See id.
339. See id. (citing 2013 N.Y.C. Local Law 81).
340. See id. (citing Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency and Building
Resiliency Task Force).
341. See id. (citing 2013 N.Y.C. Local Law 79).
342. Build Better Codes, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.
org/advocacy/campaigns/build-better-codes [http://perma.cc/JB8N-VCTF] (last visited
Mar. 25, 2014).
The IgCC includes ASHRAE (American Society of Heating,
Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers) Standard 189.1 as a compliance
pathway. ASHRAE has published a guide to its Standard 189.1 and a “FAQ.”
ASHRAE JOURNAL’S GUIDE TO STANDARD 189.1:
BALANCING ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITY, RESOURCE EFFICIENCY & OCCUPANT COMFORT (June 2010), https://
www.ashrae.org/File%20Library/docLib/Publications/AJSupplement_189-1-1-.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8L7-HE63]; FAQ—STANDARD 189.1: STANDARD FOR THE DESIGN OF
HIGH PERFORMANCE, GREEN BUILDINGS EXCEPT LOW-RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS,
https://www.ashrae.org/File%20Library/docLib/Publications/189-1-FAQ-4-26-12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PCY6-NY4A] (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
343. INT’L CODE COUNCIL, AN OVERVIEW OF THE 2012 INTERNATIONAL GREEN
CONSTRUCTION CODE 13–14 (2012), http://www.iccsafe.org/international-green-
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IgCC was not explicitly crafted for the purpose of promoting
disaster resilience, the USGBC regards the adoption of model
codes like the IgCC as essential to minimizing the negative
effects of extreme weather events.344
Unlike LEED345 and other voluntary rating systems, the
IgCC is intended to be adopted on a mandatory basis in order
to raise the floor for environmental standards.346 Despite this,
most local jurisdictions that have adopted the IgCC have made
it voluntary.347 For example, Florida adopted the IgCC as an
option for the retrofitting and new construction of all stateowned facilities, Boynton Beach, Florida adopted the IgCC as
the core of its local voluntary green code, and the cities of
Phoenix and Scottsdale, Arizona, and the Kayenta Township (a
tribal community in Arizona) adopted the IgCC for voluntary
use.348
Although the City did not adopt the IgCC as a mandatory
code, it did follow the IgCC model of incorporating
sustainability and resilience principles in an enforceable code.
In doing so, the task force concluded that “greening” the

construction-code/ (scroll to bottom of page and click “An Overview of the 2012
International Green Construction Code”) [http://perma.cc/53VH-WJRE]. The code
spans construction projects both spatially (providing standards applicable to the entire
project site and all materials related to the project) and temporally (covering site
selection and development through pre-occupancy inspection, commissioning and
maintenance). Id. at 11–17.
344. USGBC, GREENING THE CODES 6 (2011), http://www.usgbc.org/Docs/Archive/
General/Docs7403.pdf [http://perma.cc/7XDV-Y9ZL].
345. LEED refers to the USGBC’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
Green Building Rating System.
LEED standards are third-party benchmark
assessment tools that promote sustainable design and construction principles. See id.
at 1. See generally Sarah Adams-Schoen, On the Waterfront: New York City’s Climate
Change Adaptation and Mitigation Challenge, Part II, 25 ENVTL. L. N.Y. 101, 102–104
(2014) (analyzing the LEED standards and their use in New York).
346. “Where adopted on a mandatory basis, the IgCC raises the floor of
sustainability for all buildings–positioning the IgCC to achieve massive environmental
benefits not possible with voluntary rating systems.” INT’L CODE COUNCIL, supra note
343.
347. See INT’L CODE COUNCIL, ICC FACT SHEET—FIRST INTERNATIONAL GREEN
CONSTRUCTION CODE (IGCC) ADOPTIONS 1 [hereinafter “ICC FACT SHEET”], http://www.
iccsafe.org/cs/IGCC/Documents/First_IgCC_Adoptions_FactSheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/
6E4W-A9YH] (last visited Mar. 25, 2015); see also INTERNATIONAL CODES-ADOPTION BY
STATE, INT’L CODE COUNCIL 1 (Feb. 2015), http://www.iccsafe.org/gr/Documents/state
adoptions.pdf [http://perma.cc/K67F-HHWY] (listing the state-by-state adoption of the
I-codes).
348. See ICC FACT SHEET, supra note 347, at 1.
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building codes “has significant advantages over mandating
LEED for the private sector.”349 Of course, the options for
increasing the resilience and decreasing the substantial carbon
footprint350 of the City’s buildings are far from binary. Options
range from green building ordinances that apply only to
municipal construction or renovation projects, to those that
apply to private projects that receive public funding, to those
that apply to both public and private projects.351 Further
options exist within each of these schemes, including
application of requirements based on project size or type of
building. With respect to rating systems, some municipalities
use LEED rating systems, others use different third-party
rating systems, and still others create their own rating
systems. Some municipalities permit developers to meet LEED
“equivalents”352 or comply with LEED guidelines without
requiring receipt of LEED certification. Even among those that
mandate LEED certification (or equivalents), different
municipalities require different levels of LEED certification
and allow waivers under different scenarios. Some ordinances
mandate that developers meet certain standards, while others

349. NYC GREEN CODES, supra note 151, at 1; see also id. at 1–2 (listing benefits of
greening the building codes); Adams-Schoen, supra note 345, at 102 (discussing the
benefits of greening the building codes).
350. According to the 2013 New York City Local Law 84 Benchmarking Report, New
York City’s buildings accounted for nearly 75% of the City’s total GHG emissions, 94%
of the City’s electrical consumption and 85% of its water usage. BENCHMARKING
REPORT 2014, supra note 27, at 5.
351. Patricia E. Salkin, Cooperative Federalism and Climate Change: New Meaning
to “Think Globally—Act Locally,” 40 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW INST.) 10562, 10567
(2010).
Numerous municipalities have mandated LEED certification for new
construction and major renovations or otherwise required that city-owned buildings be
built according to green building criteria, including Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Boulder,
Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Portland, San Diego, San Francisco, San José, and
Seattle. See 2005 N.Y.C. Local Law 86 § 1, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dob/downloads/pdf/ll_86of2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/RM7Y-U5U3] (listing municipalities
that have implemented green building requirements).
352. Ordinances that provide incentives for LEED “equivalents” apply not just to
LEED, but also to other rating systems that the jurisdictions deems equivalent. See,
e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §46-19.6 (2015) (requiring counties to give priority application
processing for projects that achieve LEED Silver or equivalent); Montreat, N.C., Code
of General Ordinances, Chap. J, Art. I, § 4 (“Projects providing proof of equivalent
nationally or state recognized certification or rating systems with third-party
verification of sustainable building practices may also be eligible for comparable
rebates proportionate to level of certification.”).
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create incentive schemes.353
Additionally, many states,
including New York, require LEED for state-owned buildings,
provide tax credits for buildings that meet certain green
building criteria, and require state agencies to reduce energy
use and carbon dioxide emissions and utilize green building
principles.354
Although not readily apparent from the NYC Green Codes
Task Force report, New York City has adopted a scheme for
certain public and private sector developments that includes
both “greening” its building codes and mandating LEED
certifiability. New York City enacted Local Law 84 in 2005, a
green building law that requires municipal projects costing
more than $2 million to be designed to meet or exceed certain
LEED criteria, although actual certification is not required.355
The LEED requirements also apply to private developments
that receive more than 50% City funding or more than $10
million of City money.356
Additionally, the Task Force proposals include many
requirements that are the same or substantially similar to the
IgCC. For example, both the Task Force proposals and the
IgCC include requirements that alterations made to existing
buildings conform to the new green codes,357 air-conditioning
systems serving occupied spaces have filters rated at MERV 11
or higher,358 and establish performance standards for building
envelopes with respect to heat loss.359
353. See generally 2005 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 86 § 1, available at http://
www.nyc.gov/html/dob/downloads/pdf/ll_86of2005.pdf
[http://perma.cc/RM7Y-U5U3]
(summarizing various green building initiatives).
354. Id.
355. Buildings classified in occupancy groups G or H-2 must achieve the lowest level
of LEED certifiability; all other buildings must achieve a minimum of LEED silver
certifiability. 2005 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 86 § 2, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dob/downloads/pdf/ll_86of2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/RM7Y-U5U3].
356. Id.
357. IgCC § 1003.1 (2012), available at http://publicecodes.cyberregs.com/icod/
IgCC/2012/icod_IgCC_2012_10_sec003.htm [http://perma.cc/DU76-2L5P]; NYC GREEN
CODES TASK FORCE: FULL PROPOSALS, at OC3-1 to OC3-2 (Feb. 2010), http://
www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/downloads/pdf/gctf_all_proposals.pdf
[http://perma.cc/U49ALBYX].
358. IgCC § 803.5 (2012); NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at HT5-1.
Note that the Task Force proposal imposes this requirement only on systems providing
ventilation of outdoor air with a design capacity greater than or equal to 5,000 cfm. Id.
359. Specifically, the Task Force proposal uses ASHRAE 90.1 with additional fixed
performance standards. NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at EF3-1.
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The Task Force proposals also include numerous
recommendations that go above and beyond the IgCC.360 These
proposals include: (a) requiring entry mat systems to protect
indoor air from street particulates;361 (b) requiring improved
design parameters, testing, and balancing for exhaust
ventilation systems in new residential construction;362 (c)
requiring the use of mold-resistant gypsum board and cement
board in water-sensitive locations such as bathrooms;363 (d)
prohibiting the issuance of new permits for boilers using #4
and #6 fuel oil and requiring all new burners to use #2 fuel or
gas fuel;364 (e) phasing out all existing polychlorinated biphenyl
and magnetic ballasts by 2019;365 (f) reducing the level of
required emergency lighting, which would reduce battery
size;366 (g) requiring wastewater from concrete mixer trucks to
be either treated on site or returned to the manufacturing
plant for treatment;367 (h) requiring various design features
and signage to promote stairway use as a means of promoting
fitness and physical activity;368 and (i) increasing the number of
required water fountains in commercial buildings to reduce
consumers’ intake of bottled water and sugary sodas.369 The
Task Force also proposed to require all new residential
buildings of three stories or less to be constructed pursuant to

The IgCC requires that building envelopes exceed the requirements of the
International Energy Conservation Code by no less than 10%. IgCC § 605 (2012).
360. This is not surprising given that the IgCC is not specifically targeted at
disaster resiliency and the IgCC was intended to be a set of minimum standards.
361. See NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at HT4-1.
362. Id. at HT6-1.
363. Id. at HT7-1.
364. Id. at HT9-1.
365. Id. at HT10-1. The IgCC has no such requirement, but has a verification
requirement providing that “prior to issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the field
inspector shall confirm the installation of luminaires, type and quantity; lamps, type,
wattage and quantity, and ballasts, type and performance for not less than one
representative luminaire of each type, for consistency with the approved construction
documents.” IgCC § 608.10 (2012).
366. See NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at HT12-1. The IgCC
provides code enforcement officials with the discretion to waive its lighting efficiency
requirements because of emergency lighting considerations. IgCC § 608.9.
367. See NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at HR13-1.
368. Id. at HT15-1 to HT18-1; see also id. at HT19-1 (the Task Force also
recommends including a zoning bonus as an incentive for buildings that make stairs
prominent and accessible).
369. Id. at HT20-1.
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Energy Star standards.370
The IgCC does not apply to
residential structures of three stories or less.
One area in need of further evaluation is the inclusion of
multiple compliance options or, alternatively, the use of
ASHRAE Standard 90.1 (recommended by the Task Force)
versus the more rigorous ASHRAE Standard 189.1
(incorporated as a compliance option in the IgCC).371
Currently, the New York Energy Conservation Code essentially
consists of two separate but comprehensive codes, allowing
individual designers to choose as their compliance option either
ASHRAE Standard 90.1 or Chapter 8 of the International
Energy Conservation Code. The Task Force found that the
simultaneous enforcement of two codes is no longer tenable and
proposed requiring all commercial buildings to comply with
ASHRAE 90.1.372 Similarly, prior to the creation of the IgCC,
the ICC’s International Energy Conservation Code referenced
ASHRAE 90.1, allowing individual designers to choose
ASHRAE 90.1 as a compliance path. This essentially created
two compliance paths in every participating jurisdiction. The
IgCC eliminated this system by including ASHRAE 189.1 as an
optional compliance pathway for jurisdictions, not individual
designers, to adopt on a mandatory basis.373
Nevertheless, by incorporating many enforceable standards
equivalent to IgCC standards and some that exceed IgCC
standards, the task force proposals certainly are progressive.
However, the Urban Green Council concluded in its report 90

370. Id. at EF2-1.
371. Standard 90.1, Energy Standard for Buildings except Low-Rise Residential
Buildings, provides minimum requirements for the energy-efficient design of new and
renovated or retrofitted buildings. ASHRAE, STANDARD 90.1, ENERGY STANDARD FOR
BUILDINGS EXCEPT LOW-RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS (2013). 90.1-2004 has been
approved by DOE as the minimum standard for all states. ASHRAE Standard 189.12011, Standard for the Design of High-Performance, Green Buildings except Low-Rise
Residential Buildings, provides minimum requirements for the siting, design, and
construction of high performance, green buildings. ASHRAE, STANDARD 189.1:
STANDARD FOR THE DESIGN OF HIGH PERFORMANCE, GREEN BUILDINGS EXCEPT LOWRISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS FAQ (2014), available at www.ashrae.org/greenstandard
[http://perma.cc/9RN9-EUCN].
372. See NYC GREEN CODES PROPOSALS, supra note 155, at EF1-1.
373. INT’L CODE COUNCIL, SYNOPSIS—INTERNATIONAL GREEN CONSTRUCTION CODE,
PUBLIC VERSION 2.0, NOVEMBER 2010 2 (2010), available at http://www.iccsafe.org/cs/
IGCC/Documents/PublicVersion/IGCC_PV2_Synopsis.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4QA96VG7].
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by 50: NYC Can Reduce Its Carbon Footprint that the City can
and must go further:
“the extreme emission reductions
required to minimize climate change are in fact possible using
technologies that are known and in almost all cases currently
available, and that the costs are comparable to the lifetime
savings.”374 To achieve these deeper reductions, the report
recommends, among other things, the use of even greater air
sealing and heat recovery systems, photovoltaic panels to
produce renewable electricity on site, mini-split heat pumps for
most apartments, ground-source heat pumps for commercial
and larger residential buildings, and air-source heat pumps for
hot water.375 Notably, the report found that “many of the
measures introduced to mitigate climate change also increase
building resilience . . . . For example, greater thermal integrity
ensures buildings that will remain more habitable without
services such as heat, hot water, or electricity.”376
F. Lack of Intergovernmental Integration—A Formidable
Obstacle to Coastal Climate Change Resilience
In its 2015 report NPCC2 concluded that it is “essential” that
New York City “facilitate an ongoing and continuous process of
stakeholder-scientist interactions” with coordination between
the relevant experts and multiple scales of government,
including the other municipalities of the New York
metropolitan region.377 Implicit in this recommendation are
two critiques—one based on the failure of the City’s current
initiatives to effectively incorporate the City’s extensive
suburbs, and another based on the need for increased
integration with relevant state and federal agencies.

374. URBAN GREEN COUNCIL, supra note 273, at 1.
375. Id. at 4.
376. Id.
377. NPCC 2015, supra note 97, at 16 (“Collaboration across multiple scales of
government will help to ensure that the climate science developed for the New York
metropolitan region informs and draws from the best available information, thereby
positioning residents and planners to confront expected future changes in the most
effective way possible.”).
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1. Municipalities Must Look Elsewhere for a Regional Model
that Incorporates a Hub City and Its Extensive Suburbs
It probably goes without saying that New York City’s suite of
initiatives does not provide a comprehensive adaptation and
mitigation model for suburban municipalities. However, given
New York City’s expertise and resources,378 the City is well
poised to work with its extensive surrounding suburban
communities (beyond the five boroughs) to create a
comprehensive regional climate change adaptation and
mitigation plan. Moreover, because the impacts of climate
change and the strategies to adapt to those impacts do not
happen in isolation, municipalities must take care that a
particular strategy, which may reduce vulnerability or decrease
emissions in one area, does not increase risk and vulnerability
in another area.379 Indeed, in its latest report, NPCC2 urged
New York City to both strengthen the initiatives in A Stronger,
More Resilient New York and to expand them “to the entire
New York metropolitan region.”380
The need for an integrated strategy that prevents, for
example, development from moving from low-emissions
generating areas to high-emissions generating areas may be
particularly acute in and around New York City, where the
difference between urban and suburban emissions is greater
than in many other areas of the country.381 Based on their
finding of a strong negative correlation between emissions and
the level of land use controls restricting development,382
378. See ONE CITY, BUILT TO LAST, supra note 16, at 3 (commenting on NYC
expertise and resources by Mayor de Blasio).
379. Salkin, supra note 223, at 925 (finding that integration is a key challenge for
local governments facing climate change risks).
380. NPCC 2015, supra note 97, at 16.
381. See Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew E. Kahn, The Greenness of Cities: Carbon
Dioxide Emissions and Urban Development, 67 J. URBAN ECON. 404, 408 (2010)
(finding that New York City had the most extreme emissions difference between the
central city and suburbs, based on a comparative study of 48 metropolitan areas, and
estimating that suburban development around New York City causes more than 300
dollars more damage in carbon dioxide emissions than central city development, based
on an assumed social cost figure of 43 dollars per ton of CO2). Given the 2000 and 2001
vintage of some of the data used for this study, results should be considered illustrative
only. See id. at 405 (citing sources of data and describing study methodology).
382. Id. at 405. Glaeser and Kahn based their comparisons between metropolitan
areas (as opposed to within metropolitan areas) on data from 66 major metropolitan
areas in the United States. Id. at 405.
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Edward Glaeser and Matthew Kahn hypothesized that “current
land use restrictions may be doing exactly the opposite of what
a climate change activist may have hoped. Those restrictions,
often implemented for local environmental reasons (such as to
preserve open space or reduce neighborhood traffic), seem to
push new development towards the least environmentally
friendly urban areas.”383
Moreover, regardless of whether restrictive urban land use
regulations cause increased suburban development, the need
for climate change adaptation and mitigation regional plans
that integrate the extensive suburban communities
surrounding hub cities in the United States is nevertheless
acute. The majority of the population resides in suburbs,
suburbs have a higher per capita carbon footprint than urban
areas, and suburbs are less likely to take action on climate
change.384 By 2040, the United States is projected to add 93
million new homes to accommodate its rapidly growing
population.385 Based on current trends, most of these homes
will be single-family homes that are significantly less energy
efficient than their multifamily counterparts;386 and, based on
current planning practices, the occupants of these single-family
homes will continue to commute by car to work, play, and
shop.387 Suburban communities need encouragement and
383. Id. at 408 (citations omitted).
384. John R. Nolon, The Land Use Stabilization Wedge Strategy: Shifting Ground
to Mitigate Climate Change, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3–4 (2009); see
also Hossein Estiri, Residential Energy (and Water) Expenditure and the City-Suburb
Dichotomy; A Case Study of the Puget Sound Region, WA 1 (Dep’t of Urban Design &
Plan. Univ. of Wash., Working Paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246596 [http://perma.cc/K42Y-L355] (reporting results
from case study of Washington state Puget Sound region showing that, “in general, the
likelihood of living in a housing unit with high energy (and water) cost was higher in
the suburb and slightly lower in the city,” “suburban renters are more likely to live in
housing units with high energy and water costs[, and t]he effect of the number of
children in the suburbs was greater on the estimated odds of living in a highexpenditure housing unit than in the city”); but see id. at 2 (arguing that research
about variations in residential energy consumption within metropolitan areas is
inconclusive).
385. Nolon, supra note 384, at 3–4 (citing studies).
386. Id. (citing studies).
387. See Edward L. Glaeser, Green Cities, Brown Suburbs: To Save the Planet,
Build More Skyscrapers—Especially in California, 2009 CITY J. 50 (2009) (finding
suburban development patterns often facilitate consumption of higher quantities of the
bundle of housing services, including bigger and newer homes and more use of cars,
and lower density); David Brownstone & Thomas F. Golob, The Impact Of Residential
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support to assess their climate vulnerabilities, plan and
implement adaptation and mitigation strategies, and, in some
cases, expand their current efforts beyond building and
vehicles initiatives to land use and planning measures.388 As
one commentator has noted, “[S]o far, climate action has
extended slowly to suburbia. Central cities in smart growth
states have taken on climate change, but vast swaths of
metropolitan suburbia continue to reproduce a political
geography of local free-riding.”389
Thus, effective adaptation planning and implementation, as
well as mitigation, will benefit from integrated adaptation and
mitigation plans that recognize the distinct needs of suburbs
and the interplay between urban hubs and their oftenextensive networks of suburbs.390 New York City and other
hub cities striving to mitigate climate change and increase
local resilience would therefore be wise to pursue an integrated
planning strategy that includes surrounding suburban
communities. As Touro Law Center Dean Patricia Salkin
urges in the context of New York State’s climate change
initiatives, “the true potential of [the State’s substantial
activity with respect to climate change and energy efficiency
issues] will not be fully realized” without “a coordinated,
comprehensive, and fully integrated inter-jurisdictional
approach to addressing these challenges.”391

Density on Vehicle Usage and Energy Consumption, 65 J. URB. ECON. 91, 91–92 (2009)
(finding suburban development patterns often facilitate consumption of higher
quantities of the bundle of housing services); William A.V. Clark et al., Residential
Mobility and Neighbourhood Outcomes, 21 HOUSING STUD. 323, 323 (2006) (finding
that households often “move up” to higher quality houses and neighborhoods, which are
often in suburban locations).
388. Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts: Possibilities for Small
and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, National, and International
Networks, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 440 (2012).
389. Yonn Dierwechter, Metropolitan Geographies of US Climate Action: Cities,
Suburbs, and the Local Divide in Global Responsibilities, 12 J. ENVTL. POL’Y & PLAN.
59, 79 (2010); Osofsky, supra note 388.
390. See Osofsky, supra note 388 (finding that not only are suburbs are distinct
from urban cores, different types of suburbs exist, each of which present distinct
challenges and opportunities for building community resilience). See also WGII
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 29, at 25 (“Adaptation is place- and contextspecific, with no single approach for reducing risks appropriate across all settings (high
confidence).”).
391. Salkin, supra note 223, at 926.
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2. The Need for More State and Federal Support of Local
Climate Resilience Planning
The inadequate participation rates of U.S. municipalities in
climate change adaptation and mitigation planning are often
obscured by sources that focus on the work of a few model
cities.392 Other sources use phrasing or provide accurate, albeit
incomplete, information that suggests optimistic results when
in fact the results are anything but. For example, the Center
for Climate & Energy Solutions reported in 2006 that “[i]n
1995, only 15 local governments in the United States were
engaged in climate protection activities. 11 years later, that
number has grown to 200 cities.”393 Notwithstanding the
accuracy of this statement, by failing to alert the reader that
200 cities is less than 1% of U.S. cities,394 the reader may
mistakenly interpret the statement as signifying a high U.S.
participation rate in climate protection activities—when the
opposite is true. According to a survey administered by ICLEI
in 2011, the United States had the lowest percentage of cities
pursuing adaptation planning395 and the lowest percentage of
cities that had completed an assessment of their vulnerabilities
and risks.396
This troubling data is one of many indicators that local
governments throughout the United States need more federal
and state support for their climate resilience planning.397
392. And, indeed, I am guilty of this. See, e.g., Adams-Schoen, supra note 208, at
82–90.
393. CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, Climate Change 101: Local Action,
in CLIMATE CHANGE 101: UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE 1, 8 (2006).
394. In the United States, there are approximately 36,000 sub-county generalpurpose governments and approximately 3,600 urban areas. See Lists & Structure of
Governments—Population of Interest: Municipalities & Townships, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/govs/go/municipal_township_govs.html
[http://
perma.cc/96J5-LNNN] (last visited May 21, 2015) (identifying 36,011 sub-county
general-purpose governments in 2007).
395. ICLEI 2011 SURVEY, supra note 11, at 14.
396. Id. at 10.
397. Although Congress continues to remain gridlocked on climate change, the
executive branch has taken numerous actions to incentivize climate change adaptation
at the state and local levels. See, e.g., FEMA, FP 302-094-2, State Mitigation Plan
Review Guide (effective Mar. 6, 2016) (requiring state mitigation plans to consider
changing future conditions, including climate conditions), available at http://
www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1425915308555-aba3a873bc5f1140f7320d1ebebd18
c6/State_Mitigation_Plan_Review_Guide_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/2YU9-79W4]; see
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Federal and state law delegates much of the authority relevant
to climate change adaptation and mitigation to municipal
governments, and yet state and federal policy fails to support
local governments in this role through adequate funding,
technical support, and complimentary laws and policies.398
Nearly all U.S. cities surveyed by ICLEI reported that securing
funding for adaptation is a challenge (approximately 90%) and
only 6% reported that the federal government fully understood
the realities they face with respect to adaptation.399
Consistent with the 2011 ICLEI survey results, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) concluded in a 2013
report that, although the federal government plays a critical
role in producing the information needed to facilitate informed
local infrastructure adaptation decisions, this information is
not easily accessible to local decision makers.400 The governors,
mayors, and other local leaders on the President’s Task Force
on Climate Preparedness and Resilience also concluded in their
report to the President in November 2014 that “projects and
investments are being advanced without adequate and
coordinated consideration of the project design or alternatives
relative to climate impacts and greenhouse gas emissions, a
direction that generates unacceptable public health, safety, and
financial risks for communities.”401
Similarly, a 2014
also Third Allocation, Waivers, and Alternative Requirements for Grantees Receiving
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Disaster Recovery Funds in Response
to Hurricane Sandy, 79 F.R. 62182, 62186 (Oct. 16, 2014), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-10-16/pdf/2014-24662.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
CSE5-7CRA] (allocating $335 million in federal funds to New York for the first phase of
the “Big U,” a plan for the protection of 10 continuous miles of New York City).
398. See John R. Nolon, Climate Change and Sustainable Development: The Quest
for Green Communities, Part II, PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 5 (2009); but see Community Risk
and Resiliency Act, 2014 N.Y. Laws 355 (directing state agencies to prepare model
municipal laws taking into consideration sea-level rise and other climate-related
events and “develop additional guidance on the use of resiliency measures that utilize
natural resources and natural processes to reduce risk”).
399. ICLEI 2011 SURVEY, supra note 11, at 22–24.
400. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO REPORT: FUTURE FEDERAL ADAPTATION
EFFORTS COULD BETTER SUPPORT LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE DECISION MAKERS 80 (Apr.
12, 2013), available at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-242 [http://perma.cc/5935-8ZDB].
401. See THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT’S STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LEADERS TASK
FORCE ON CLIMATE PREPAREDNESS AND RESILIENCE: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
PRESIDENT 20 (recommendation 2.7) (Nov. 2014), available at https://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/docs/task_force_report_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3P9VZXSH].
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Georgetown Climate Center report on how to improve federal
programs to support local climate change preparedness found
that many local governments “have been looking to the federal
government for help and guidance, only to run into challenges
tapping into federal programs and resources.”402
Interestingly, the Georgetown report concluded that
perception is often worse than reality and a number of
relatively small changes could provide local government with
at least some of the needed support:
While it is true that there are some limitations, barriers [to
leveraging federal programs to promote adaptation] are often
more perceived than real.
While additional resources are certainly needed, adaptation
does not require expansive new programs or legislation. Entities
at all levels of government have plans, tools, and resources that
can be amended, repurposed, or deployed to support adaptation.
Where barriers to adaptation do exist, short-term workarounds
are often available while working towards long-term fixes.
Funding constraints limit opportunities for sensible
investments in adaptation. The way federal agencies currently
make investment decisions often appear [sic] to be “penny wise
and pound foolish.”403

Assuming plans, tools and resources exist that can be
“repurposed, or deployed” to support local governments, and
“short-term workarounds” are indeed available, any delay in
comprehensive assessment and implementation of federal
support for local government adaptation (and mitigation)
initiatives seems, at best, misguided, and, at worst,
negligent.404 With respect to the “penny wise and pound
foolish” critique, many sources, including New York City, have
completed economic analyses that show that mitigation and
adaptation efforts require large upfront investment, but result
in long-term cost savings of many times the initial
402. GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR, PREPARING OUR COMMUNITIES FOR CLIMATE
IMPACTS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL ACTION 5 (2014), available at http://www.
georgetownclimate.org/sites/www.georgetownclimate.org/files/GCC%20-%20
Recommendations%20for%20Federal%20Action%20-%20September%202014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6JYR-KJMS].
403. Id. at 6.
404. See generally Burkett, supra note 73 (discussing potential tort liability for
failure to mitigate climate-change related hazards).
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investment.405 Additionally, these initial investments also
result in significant nonmonetary benefits like increased public
health and wellbeing.406
One step that state and federal governments can take to
support local adaptation and mitigation initiatives is to remove
existing preemption hurdles. Municipalities face preemption
hurdles with respect to numerous potential mitigation
initiatives.407 California’s efforts to reduce GHG emissions
from cars illustrates “[t]he dynamic and topsy-turvy reception
of state climate efforts.”408 As summarized by Kristen Engel
and Marc Miller, California had to
win its effort to obtain a judicial reversal of EPA’s denial of a
waiver of federal preemption under the federal Clean Air
Act[,] . . . survive a legal challenge filed by the automobile
industry claiming that the state’s standards are preempted by
405. See, e.g., MULTIHAZARD MITIGATION COUNCIL, NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION
SAVES: AN INDEPENDENT STUDY TO ASSESS THE FUTURE SAVINGS FROM MITIGATION
ACTIVITIES 5 (2005), available at https://www.nibs.org/?page=mmc_projects#nhms
[https://perma.cc/7VJA-4LGK] (reporting in 2005 that, on average, each dollar spent on
hazard mitigation (i.e., adaptation) saves society $4 in avoided future losses);
STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT, supra note 7, at 40 (claiming implementation of 37
“Phase I” measures could reduce expected losses in a Sandy-like storm in the 2050s by
up to 25%, or more than $22 billion); MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY
EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY iii (July 2009) (estimating $520 billion invested in
non-transportation energy efficiency in the United States by 2020 could generate
energy savings over $1.2 trillion); see generally Klass, supra note 292, at 10040
(discussing McKinsey & Company report and other cost savings from mitigation
initiatives).
406. See, e.g., LUCAS DE MONCUIT, CARBONN CITIES CLIMATE REGISTRY: 2013
ANNUAL REPORT 21 (2014) (“[c]urrent data reveal that supporting the green urban
economy and improving urban air quality are the most common co-benefits of
mitigation actions while improving public health is seen as a co-benefit for 18% of
adaptation actions”).
407. See, e.g., Air Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Inst. v. City of
Albuquerque, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1134 (D.N.M. 2010) (holding that code provisions
that required HVAC systems and equipment in small retail and office buildings and
one- and two-family detached dwellings and townhouses to comply with minimum
efficiency standards were preempted by the federal Energy Policy and Conservation
Act); see also Elliot Schatmeier, Avoiding Albuquerque: How Incentive-Based Green
Infrastructure Codes May Regulate Appliance Efficiency Standards and Avoid Federal
Preemption, COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.columbiaenvironmental
law.org/articles/avoiding-albuquerque-how-incentive-based-green-building-codes-mayregulate-appliance-efficiency-standards-and-avoid-federal-preemption [http://perma.cc/
6ZKQ-HF5E].
408. ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
1143 (6th ed. 2011).
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federal fuel efficiency laws[, and] . . . counter arguments by the
U.S. Department of Transportation that California’s standards
[were] preempted by a federal fuel economy law.409

New York City’s attempts to limit the GHG emissions from
its substantial taxicab fleet have not fared so well.410 In 2007,
the City announced in its long-term comprehensive
sustainability plan, PlaNYC: Greener, Greater New York, a
policy of “doubl[ing] the efficiency of new taxis by 2012” by
limiting taxicab emissions.411 The City’s Taxi and Limousine
Commission (“TLC”) implemented the policy by passing a rule
requiring taxicabs to meet a minimum miles-per-gallon
rating.412 One month later, on May 22, 2007, Mayor Bloomberg
announced that the City planned to make the taxicab fleet fully
hybrid by 2012.413 A year later, a federal district court
invalidated the City rule, holding that rule was preempted
under the federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(“EPCA”), which expressly preempts state or local actions
“related to fuel economy standards.”414 The City responded by
creating a system of financial incentives and disincentives to
encourage taxi owners to switch to hybrid vehicles by reducing
the amount they can charge to lease vehicles that do not have a
hybrid or clean diesel engine. A federal district court found
409. Kristen H. Engel & Marc L. Miller, State Governance: Leadership on Climate
Change, Ch. 29, in AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 449 (J. Dernbach ed., Envtl.
L. Inst. 2009); see also California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards;
Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009
and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor
Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,156–12,157 (Mar. 6, 2008) (denying California request
for waiver of the preemption provision in section 209 of the Clean Air Act); Notice of
Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and
Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles,
74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,744–32,746 (July 8, 2009) (reversing prior decision and
granting waiver); GLICKSMAN & MARKELL, supra note 408, at 1143 (quoting Engels and
Miller and discussing federal preemption of state and local climate change initiatives,
and federal savings clauses).
410. See GREENER, GREATER, supra note 11, at 122–24 (describing plan to reduce
GHG emissions from taxi and car-for-hire fleet of more than 30,000 vehicles); see also
ICLEI PLANYC CASE STUDY, supra note 30, at 41 (“Taxis travel an average of 80,000
miles per year in New York City.”).
411. GREENER, GREATER, supra note 11, at 122–24.
412. TLC Rule § 3.03(c)(10)–(11), 35 R.C.N.Y. § 3-03(c)(10)–(11).
413. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 7837(PAC), 2008
WL 4866021, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter “Metro. Taxicab I”].
414. Id.
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that this regulation was a de facto mandate that related to fuel
economy standards and emissions regulations, and was
therefore preempted under both EPCA and the Clean Air
Act.415 Despite these preemption hurdles, by 2010, the City’s
advocacy combined with benefits inherent to hybrid vehicles
such as reduced fuel costs, resulted in conversion of 25% of the
13,237-vehicle New York City taxi fleet to hybrids.416
Nevertheless, the circuitous—and as a result costly and
delayed—routes to success for both the City and California
with respect to these vehicle emissions initiatives illustrate the
obstacles preemption challenges pose to certain local climate
change mitigation actions.
Another step state and federal governments can take now to
support local adaptation and mitigation initiatives is to support
the delivery of downscaled climate data and the development of
regional and sub-regional projections and mapping.417 The
GAO recommended in its 2013 report that a federal entity
designated by the Executive Office of the President work with
agencies to:
(1) “identify for decision makers the ‘best
available’ climate-related information for infrastructure
planning,” and (2) “clarify sources of local assistance for
incorporating climate-related information and analysis into
infrastructure planning . . . .”418 Federal and state support that
415. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 105–106
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter “Metro. Taxicab II”], aff’d, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010)
(agreeing with preemption conclusion under EPCA and upholding preliminary
injunction against city); see also Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 94 (D.
Mass. 2009) (holding Boston ordinance requiring hybrid taxicabs ‘‘related to’’ fuel
economy standards and was thus preempted under EPCA’s preemption provision even
though the ordinance did not include a specific miles-per-gallon standard); but see
Green Alliance Taxi Cab Ass’n v. King Cnty., No. C 08-1048 RAJ, 2010 WL 2643369, at
*5 (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2010) (denying motion for summary judgment and
distinguishing Metro. Taxicab I, Metro. Taxicab II, and Ophir on basis that King
County green taxi incentive program was voluntary and did not “constitute a mandate
applicable to the entire taxi industry”).
416. ICLEI PLANYC CASE STUDY, supra note 30, at 41.
417. But see New York Community Risk and Resiliency Act, Ch. 355, N.Y. Laws of
2014 (directing state agencies to prepare climate projections and model municipal laws
taking into consideration sea-level rise and other climate-related events).
418. GAO, supra note 400, at 87. The GAO also advised that revision of the White
House Counsel on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) guidelines on National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) reviews of climate change impacts and risks could
provide much-needed support to state and local governments. Id. CEQ has since
issued draft revised NEPA guidelines. CEQ, REVISED DRAFT GUIDANCE (released Dec.
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ensures the availability of data and information at a resolution
relevant to local decision makers could go a long way in
supporting local decision-makers’ efforts to incorporate
potential climate change impacts in infrastructure planning.
CONCLUSION
New York City, like other major cities around the world, has
acknowledged the problem of climate change, undertaken a
comprehensive risk assessment, created a suite of adaptation
and mitigation planning initiatives, and begun to implement
proactive policies to decrease the city’s contribution to the
problem and to make the city less vulnerable to the effects of
climate change. The City’s initiatives put it ahead of the pack,
especially as compared to other U.S. municipalities—and this
is particularly true of its integrated mitigation and adaptation
planning, its transparent climate change-related data analysis
initiatives including NPCC, and its comprehensive reform of
building and other related codes. The City’s commitment to
reduce GHG emissions 80% by 2050 from 2005 levels and its
progress toward that goal, as well as the City’s
acknowledgement of the disparate impact of climate change
and related risks on vulnerable populations and its
commitment to prioritize related planning efforts are also
laudable. Each of these initiatives provides useful models for
other municipalities.
However, the City faces a host of wicked policy binds,
ineffective regional structures, a lack of support at the federal
level, and numerous conditions that constrain the City’s ability
to remain resilient—including its massive population and
coastal geography, and the likelihood of continued acceleration
of warming and rising seas. In light of this, PlaNYC’s
persuasive “toughness” theme risks undermining the City’s
robust data analysis and reporting initiatives by instilling in
New Yorkers a false sense of security with respect to both the
scope of the problem and their local government’s ability to
protect them from it. The City is in a wicked policy bind when
it comes to messaging, to be sure. On the one hand, it must
2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nepa_revised_
draft_ghg_guidance_searchable.pdf [https://perma.cc/EHG3-535T].
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garner support for plans and justify the costs of implementing
them, and, on the other hand, the City must maintain
constituent confidence in its ability to govern. But, regardless,
messaging that has the effect of encouraging rebuilding and
development in vulnerable areas or otherwise leads to
unknowing
assumption
of
climate-related
risks
is
unconscionable.
Moreover, as a practical matter, such
messaging may cause constituents to take actions that
undermine the effectiveness of the City’s efforts to increase
resilience.
The City faces an equally wicked policy bind with respect to
waterfront development.
Given the foreseeable risks of
increasingly intensive and frequent coastal storms, flooding
and storm surges, coastal municipalities must carefully
evaluate their waterfront development policies to assure
consistency with future climate risks and vulnerability and
adopt regulations that curtail or eliminate waterfront
development in high-risk areas, encourage or require relocation
away from the most vulnerable areas, and take maximum
advantage of opportunities to develop natural flood-mitigation
infrastructure.
Ultimately, the City’s climate change resilience initiatives
put the city ahead of the pack and include features that provide
a model for other coastal communities. But, notwithstanding
this, the initiatives may still fall short of what is likely
required to sufficiently “moderate[] harm” from dangerous
interference with the climate system.419

419. See AR4 WGII, supra note 1, at 6 (defining “adaptation”).

